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ABSTRACT 
 This study examined the relationship between a non-Power Five Cinderella team 
in the NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Tournament and institutional financial and 
admissions factors. The purpose of this study was to examine what, if anything, changes 
for a non-Power Five school who makes the March Madness tournament as compared to 
those similar schools who do not. This was a unique study because it looks at the 
variables of percent admitted, applications, enrollment, SAT/ACT, and donations 
together, different from the current body of research which has looked at many of these 
institutional factors separately. Additionally, many of these studies are significantly 
outdated, conducted in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, and do not take into account the new 
composition of Division I athletics with the Power Five conferences and all others. This 
study also provides a non-traditional definition of Cinderella that is both logical and 
unique. The research question at the heart of this study looked at whether or not winning 
a game or just making it to the March Madness tournament for schools outside of the 
Power Five conferences led to an increase in stronger applicants or greater financial 
donations relative to schools that did not make the tournament, looking both immediately 
and three years later. The study determined that the research question was not statistically 
significant across the board using either definition of Cinderella when analyzing all non-
Power Five schools or when excluding the BIG EAST Conference. The only statistical 
findings were three years out a Cinderella team saw an increase in the number of 
applications to the school and the percent of students admitted. Implications of the study, 
limitations, as well as suggestions for future research are discussed.  
Keywords: NCAA, basketball, Division I Men’s Basketball, March Madness, Cinderella, 
non-Power Five, athletics impact on campus  
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Athletic programs of various divisional levels exist throughout the United States 
and play an important role on many college and university campuses throughout the 
country. Coverage of collegiate athletics is no longer just weekly, as most high profile 
teams are covered across the multi-media spectrum practically minute by minute. Sports 
are a major part of American culture and because of national attention institutions are 
now reaching younger audiences earlier and influencing the college choice process 
(Barkey, 2016; Hesel & Perko, 2010).  The best teams are revered, and the institutions 
reap the benefit of the national attention, exposing many individuals to the potential of 
studying at these colleges and universities that they may not otherwise have considered. 
Specifically, the most popular football bowl games and national championship and the 
men’s basketball March Madness postseason play emphasize the power of sports to 
attract students and earn substantial financial benefits for the institution.  
The first intercollegiate athletics competition was rowing between Harvard and 
Yale in 1852 and interestingly had both an exclusive sponsorship and official 
transportation sponsor, clearly influencing the progression of both commercialization and 
profitability of collegiate athletics (Bass, Schaeperkoetter, & Bunds, 2015). November 6, 
1869 marked the official beginning of collegiate football when Rutgers and Princeton 
faced off and the nation’s obsession with the sport instantly grew (NCAA, 2017a). At the 
center of collegiate athletics is the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). 
Founded March 31, 1906, the NCAA operates as a non-profit governing approximately 
1,281 institutions spread across the three levels of college athletics: Division III, Division 
II, and the highest level of competition in college sports, Division I.  
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As the popularity of Division I athletics has grown since its inception, so too have 
the revenue streams. In 1952, big time competitive athletics began when the NCAA hired 
its first full-time executive director, Walter Byers, and increased the commercialization 
of college athletics, signing the first national football contract with the National 
Broadcasting Company for $1.1 million (Martin & Christy, 2010). In 2017, the NCAA’s 
revenue distribution plan was $560,034,297 (NCAA, 2017b). Division I men’s basketball 
and football teams in particular have morphed into both national and commercial 
products, and the money generated by these high profile sports continues to grow 
(Lavigne, 2016). The 2017 NCAA revenue distribution plan included $160,508,830 in 
the basketball fund, roughly 28% of the total revenue, which was distributed to the 
specific institutions based on their performance in the March Madness Tournament 
(NCAA, 2017b). It is important to note that the College Football Playoff is the only 
college athletics Championship not owned by the NCAA, but instead run by the ten 
Football Bowl Subdivisions (FBS) conferences and Notre Dame. The 2016-17 total 
revenue shared was $440,754,513, with more than 75% being redistributed back to the 65 
institutions this study is not focusing on (NCAA, 2017b).       
 The financial discrepancies are far greater than just between Division I, II, and III 
within the NCAA athletics governing structure. In fact, the nation’s wealthiest athletic 
departments are in Division I, specifically the Power Five conferences. The Power Five 
has the majority of the most successful Division I football teams, and is comprised of the 
Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big Ten Conference (B1G), Big 12 Conference, Pac-
12 Conference, and Southeastern Conference (SEC) (NCAA, Who We Are). This 
autonomous decision granted by the NCAA in 2014 essentially allowed the five Division 
! 12 
I powerhouse football conferences, the wealthiest and most notable to the general public, 
total control over the rules implemented that both impact the student-athlete experience 
and the greater institution as a whole while maintaining membership within the NCAA 
(NCAA, 2014a).  
Based on 2014-15 NCAA data, the wealthiest athletic departments were those in 
the Power Five, recording $6 billion in revenue, nearly $4 billion more than all other 
schools combined (Lavigne, 2016). NCAA research numbers indicate this gap will 
continue to grow at the pace of the multimillion-dollar media rights contracts that in 
many ways control the moves made by the Power Five conferences (Lavigne, 2016). The 
financial gap between the Power Five conferences and all other Division I conferences 
continues to widen according to a twelve year research study conducted and published by 
the NCAA. This research indicates the growing gap between the Power Five schools and 
all others, showing an average of $43 million gap in revenue in 2008 between these 
schools and $65 million difference in 2015 (NCAA, 2014b). According to 2014-15 
NCAA research published in USA Today, the SEC conference alone brought in the 
greatest revenue of $16,907,834 with nearly $36 million from media rights being 
redistributed across the SEC campuses. For comparison, the next five non-Power Five 
Division I conferences – the BIG EAST, The American, Conference USA, Mountain 
West, and Mid-American, each earned between two and six million dollars for each 
conference affiliated school through their media agreement. (NCAA, 2014b).  
The NCAA earns the majority of its annual profits from March Madness and the 
lucrative broadcast rights agreements, a 14-year deal with CBS Sports and Turner 
Broadcasting, and tournament ticket sales. NCAA data from 2011-2012 showed that the 
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NCAA had $871.6 million in total revenue (NCAA, 2016a), and it was reported recently 
that the NCAA had close to $1.1 billion during its 2017 fiscal year (NCAA, 2016a). 
Long-term agreements have always been a part of the NCAA tournament and steadily 
have grown to massive amounts. In 1982, a three-year deal with CBS was worth $49.9 
million, and in 1991 a $1 billion seven-year deal with CBS was established (NCAA, 
2016a). The current profitable broadcast agreement impacts the 68 teams that make the 
annual tournament via financial distribution to the conferences represented in each round 
of the tournament, gradually providing conferences with deeper tournament runs more 
money. The NCAA stated that approximately 96 percent of the revenue generated from 
this deal goes directly to student athlete programing, services, or direct distribution to 
conferences and individual schools in the tournament that year (NCAA, 2016a).  
Oftentimes the greatest headlines of the NCAA tournament every March are those 
known as the Cinderella Stories. The Cinderella story in college men’s basketball is a 
well-documented storyline during the single elimination NCAA Division I Men’s 
Basketball Tournament, where typically smaller schools of usually higher seeds in each 
of the four regions of the total 68 team bracket make an unexpected run. There is no one 
universal definition of the Cinderella story; it is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary 
as “reference to a situation in which a person, team, etc., of low status or importance 
unexpectedly achieves great success or public recognition” (Cinderella story, 2018). 
March Madness was established as more than a phenomenon in 1989 when number 16 
seeded Princeton nearly upset the number one seeded Georgetown (Gregory & Wolff, 
2014). This game marked the start of what has become a part of the annual tradition of 
small basketball schools making an unsuspecting run in the tournament to either nearly 
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upset or actually beat a higher seeded team. Examples of this include Gonzaga in 1999 
losing to the number one seeded team in the Elite Eight (Anderson & Birrer, 2011), 
George Mason in 2006 losing in the Final Four (Southall, Nagel, Amis, & Southall, C., 
2008), Davidson in 2008 losing to the number one seeded team in the Elite Eight, Butler 
in 2011 losing in the National Championship game, and more recently in 2013, Florida 
Gulf Coast, a 15 seed team in the tournament upsetting the number two seeded team 
before losing in the Sweet Sixteen. All of these teams were low seeds with lower 
expectations to win; yet these surprising tournament victories on a national stage lead to 
greater notoriety in the college basketball world and beyond (Baker, 2008; Barrabi, 2015; 
Chung, 2013; Martin & Christy, 2010). 
The March Madness national stage for the annual NCAA Men’s Basketball 
Tournament presents an opportunity for widespread recognition for both a team and a 
school. As the financial gap between the Power Five and all other conferences continues 
to grow, research needs to exist to better understand the financial value and other 
institutional benefits a non-Power Five school receives just by making it into the highly 
selective tournament. Without top FBS football, a school relies strictly on institutional 
marketing dollars and an athletics-marketing budget to garner external attention and 
interest, mostly on a local level through traditional marketing measures like local signage, 
newspaper advertisements and coverage by local news channels. The March Madness 
appeal for many schools is both a part of a perception that making the tournament leads 
to significant benefits and a reality, including varying degrees of tangible benefits such as 
increasing applications, higher quality of student applicants, and donations received all 
stemming from athletic success (Frank, 2004; Pope & Pope, 2009; Smith, 2008; Toma & 
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Cross, 1998). Other potential benefits include enhancing school spirit and overall campus 
life, increasing the national publicity from greater national media coverage, and 
potentially generating new streams of revenue that can benefit more than just athletics 
(Hesel & Perko, 2010).   
While there continues to be a growing gap in the profits of Division I conferences, 
more and more athletic departments are creating mandatory student fees to offset some of 
the high expenses associated with operating Division I athletics. In 2014 students at 32 of 
the 65 Power Five schools paid a combined $125.5 million in athletic fees (Hobson & 
Rich, 2015), and for many students, they never actually attended a home athletic event. 
Student fees have become a recent staple in the landscape of higher education 
sustainability at non-Power Five schools too. Large numbers of college athletic 
departments depend increasingly on student fees for their yearly operating budgets, and a 
research study conducted by Berkowitz, Upton, McCarthy, and Gillium in 2010 reported 
that, “for the 2008-2009 school year, students were charged $798 million for support that 
went to the athletic departments (Smith, 2012). Wolverton, Hallman, Shifflet, and 
Kambhampati (2015) conducted research on student fees funding college athletics later, 
and their Chronicle analysis found that the students with the least interest in college 
sports, typically at schools with low ticket sales and other revenues, have to pay the most 
(2015). The 2017 George Mason University budget executive summary indicates 
$14,951,100 in student fee revenue, the largest some within the school’s auxiliary 
enterprises revenue (George Mason University, 2017).   
Additionally, many students are unaware that part of their annual tuition is 
funneled back into the athletic programs and high coaches salaries that really have very 
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little direct benefit on their educational pursuits. For example, after Virginia 
Commonwealth University concluded their 2011 Final Four NCAA men’s basketball run, 
the school struggled to create enough funds to compete for the counter offers that their 
highly demanded head coach Shaka Smart was attracting. In order to keep him, student 
fees were increased by $50 per student for the year, raising an additional $875,000 in 
revenue for the athletic department, with two thirds directly going to an offer for the head 
coach (Smith, 2012). Ironically in 2015 Smart left VCU to accept the head coach position 
at Texas for a $22 million contract, with most of the money guaranteed and an annual 
salary of $2.8 million in the first year with increases each year (Associated Press, 2016, 
August 5).   
There is no surprise that money is being spent on Division I athletics, but the fact 
that significant amounts of money stem from student fees is a point of contention for 
many, and as the public continues to grow more informed of the amount of money an 
institution contributes to an athletics department through student fees and other means 
(Weaver, 2010; Bass, Schaeperkoetter, & Bunds, 2015; Theus, 1993; Jones, 2013; 
Sparveo & Warner, 2013), research shows that some students may choose to study 
elsewhere, some professors may pursue different academic teaching positions (Clopton & 
Finch, 2012; Fuller, Hester, Barnett, Frey, & Relyea, 2006), and campuses as a whole 
may see a significant shift in priorities all because of big-time college athletics, leaving 
stakeholders to determine if the investment in pushing programs to be successful is worth 
it, or if discontinuing athletics on a campus is the answer.    
Statement of the Problem 
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 Opportunities for leveraging the benefits of successful athletic campaigns, such as 
making it to the NCAA Men’s Basketball tournament, exist if institutions can handle an 
influx of applicants, donations, and overall interest in the school due to the national 
success and national attention. This study will look at whether the non-Power Five 
institutions that make the tournament are able to capitalize on the newfound success and 
national attention during the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament and if these changes 
are felt immediately and/or over time. Additionally, to better understand the relationship 
between making the tournament as a Cinderella and not, a comparison group of similar 
institutions that did not receive a tournament bid that year will help to illustrate these 
athletic, academic, financial, and admissions changes between those tournament teams 
and those looking on from the outside.  
 Previous research indicates that very few Division I athletic departments are self-
sustaining, and in a study conducted by the Chronicle for Higher Education in January 
2016, the majority of the public Power Five institutions admitted to giving less than $1 of 
every $100 earned from athletics revenue to support academic programs (Wolverton & 
Kambhampati, 2016). While this study is not looking at Power Five schools, if the 
wealthiest conferences are not contributing athletic dollars back to academics, non-Power 
Five conferences cannot be expected to, allowing the perception that athletics trumps all 
other campus activities to grow. The NCAA currently states that only about two dozen of 
the 351 Division I institutions are self-sustaining, and while contributing funds back to 
academia is not required, it is well regarded since colleges and universities are 
institutions for higher learning (Lavigne, 2016). It is important to note that increasing 
revenue through athletics does not mean that the program will be self-sustaining, defined 
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as its operating revenues from ticket sales, donations, television rights and other incomes 
exceeds the operating expenses, and that in fact the athletics department may still require 
significant support from the university’s general fund or student fees (Berkowitz & 
Schnaars, 2017).   
 The competitive nature of collegiate athletics has funneled down to the practices 
key decision makers on campus are making daily. Athletic directors and even university 
presidents are continuously game planning ways in which to increase the revenue streams 
around athletic events while remaining competitive with the Power Five schools. Some 
research exists that indicates strong athletic programs have an impact on the campus as a 
whole in terms of recruiting top students and faculty (Clopton & Finch, 2012; Smith, 
2015; Shapiro, Drayer, Dwyer, & Morse, 2009; Peterson-Horner & Eckstein, 2014; 
Mulholland, Tomic & Sholander, 2014), and receiving more donations (Baade & 
Sundberg, 1996; Tucker, 2004), but very little research has been conducted to measure if 
there are significant changes to a non-Power Five college in following years. As a non-
Power Five school makes a run in the March Madness Tournament, how and whether this 
increased national visibility impacts the campus over time is a significant gap in the 
current body of research.  
Purpose of the Research 
 
Most of the research regarding the Cinderella story in college basketball focuses 
on the benefits to the athletics department. Few studies analyze the impact that making 
the tournament has on a campus as a whole, not just in one-dimensional ways such as 
increased gifts from alumni. In particular, this study differs from other studies conducted 
because it looked at multiple factors in the same study with the most recent data, 
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including the impact winning has on admissions, both in numbers of applicants and 
SAT/ACT scores of students accepted, and whether or not donations increased because of 
an NCAA Tournament appearance. The current body of research looks at many of these 
institutional factors separately: applications (McEvoy, 2005, Toma & Cross, 1998; 
Chressanthis & Grimes, 1993; Pope & Pope, 2009), higher achieving students (Mixon & 
Ressler, 1995; Pope & Pope, 2014; Tucker & Amato, 1993), graduation rates (Tucker, 
2004), and donations (Frank, 2004). Many of these studies are significantly outdated, 
conducted in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, and do not take into account the new 
composition of Division I athletics between the Power Five conferences and all others. 
Additionally, most of this research fails to include measures institutions take to sustain 
over time the gains that the sudden national attention of their men’s basketball program 
has initiated. Possibly the greatest challenge with the current literature on Division I 
men’s basketball success during the tournament and its impact on a campus is that there 
have been substantial variances in data due to studies having discrepancies in determining 
what exactly defines athletic success, which is ultimately why this study uses different 
classifications to define a Cinderella story in March.  
The exact financial impact of a team making it to the NCAA tournament becomes 
complicated for the non-Power Five conferences, especially the smaller basketball 
conference Cinderella schools who have a smaller operating budget. Each of the 68 teams 
making the tournament receives a financial payout over six years with an amount 
determined by multiple factors, including how many teams from the same conference 
have advanced, but it is the free exposure that the national tournament provides these 
schools with that creates the greatest financial benefit. For example, it is estimated that 
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Butler’s Final Four run in 2010, and George Mason’s Final Four run in 2006 generated 
roughly $450 million and $677 million of free exposure for each institution (Brennan, 
2011). In the 2018 March Madness Tournament, for the first time ever, the number one 
seed lost to a number 16 seed when Virginia was defeated by University of Maryland,  
Baltimore County. Apex Marketing Group, a branding consulting firm estimated that this 
tournament victory and sudden national exposure in print, television, and internet to be 
approximately $33 million for UMBC (Tkacik & Wenger, 2018). Some of the power of 
this March Madness victory for UMBC included Twitter followers increasing from 5,000 
on Friday to 110,000 on Sunday, 842,778 mentions on social media the past 12 months, 
and 734,284 mentions alone during the weekend of this history making game 
(GetDeestweets, 2018 March, 19). With the free media exposure, schools are able to 
reach a national audience they would otherwise have to pay a lot of money to reach, 
which for most schools is not possible.   
 Research exists that emphasizes the unexpected athletic success that directly  
correlates with institutional benefits, such as increasing applications and quality of 
students accepted, and this became known as the Flutie Effect based off of Doug Flutie’s 
football heroics at Boston College. The Flutie Effect was established in 1984 during 
Boston College’s eight-game national television broadcast schedule that exposed an 
otherwise local Boston media team to televisions in millions of homes nationwide 
(Peterson-Horner & Eckstein, 2015), and helped to catapult Boston College to the 
prestigious institution that it is today. However, very few studies have specifically 
focused on the institutions participating in the NCAA Division I men’s basketball 
tournament, particularly outside of the Power Five conferences. This national attention is 
! 21 
important because it is extremely difficult to get national attention in the college athletics 
landscape, and very expensive. The Flutie Effect, discussed in greater detail in chapter 
two, is important to understand as many institutions continue to spend significant 
amounts of money on athletic programs in the hopes of both athletic and enrollment 
success. The precise benefits, if any, of a non-Power Five institution making it to the 
tournament vary. In order to better understand this phenomenon, looking at the data from 
various areas on campus such as admissions and development, both for the years leading 
up to the NCAA tournament run and years after, will allow for any trends to be 
determined. March Madness provides an annual opportunity to a select population, and as 
institutions continue to face more competition to attract full tuition paying students and 
keep increasing costs at bay, this pivotal athletic phenomenon garners increasing 
attention and unmatched potential.    
Research Question 
To further understand how making the NCAA March Madness Tournament affects a 
non-Power Five institution, I have developed the following research question:  
1. Does winning at least one game in the March Madness Tournament or just 
solely making the 68-team tournament benefit colleges through increased and 
stronger applicants and greater financial donations relative to institutions that did 
not make the tournament?   
The criteria for the institutions I focus on will include all schools outside of the Power 
Five conferences (ACC, Big 10, Big-12, Pac-12, and SEC) who have made the NCAA 
March Madness Tournament between the years of 2003-2012. Removing the Power Five 
conferences will enable my sample to be compared to other similarly structured 
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institutions with varying basketball success. This comparison group of similar institutions 
without the same basketball success will allow for any significant changes to the 
variables based exclusively on basketball success to be seen within this non-Power Five 
population.  
Significance  
Collegiate athletics plays an important role on the campus of many institutions 
throughout the United States. Especially at the most competitive Division I level, an 
entanglement between the athletic department and the university as a whole has become a 
relationship of great focus and great strain. Research has been conducted that indicates 
athletics raises school spirit and overall interest in an institution’s academic profile, while 
encouraging a sense of university tradition and community (Won & Chelladurai, 2015). 
This study is unique in that it focuses exclusively on non-Power Five institutions and 
men’s basketball. In the landscape of Division I athletics today, basketball is different 
from football postseason play in that there is more parity setup by the format and 
structure since each conference championship has a chance to win, while football takes 
the top four FBS teams only to the playoffs. This study will benefit a multitude of 
campus constituents, including admissions, marketing, and alumni relations by 
highlighting the differences between non-Power Five schools with March Madness 
appearances and those similar schools on the outside looking in. 
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Outlining the Literature Review 
 
 Funding Division I athletics at any school is an investment, one that is oftentimes 
debated by those who think the money and resources would be better suited for usage 
outside of athletics (Brady, Berkowitz, & Upton, 2016; & Knight 2015; Goff, 2000; & 
Hoffer, Humphreys, Lacombe, & Ruseski, 2015). America is the only country that 
actually partners elite athletics with higher education. This combination of the two is seen 
as not only accepted but also actually expected at higher education institutions in 
America, and many believe the combination plays an intricate and central role on campus 
life (Thelin, 1996; Chu, 1989 & Gerdy, 2006). The idea that playing in a competitive and 
nationally broadcasted basketball game in March as a non-Power Five school will not 
only change the athletics department but the campus as a whole is a big deal.  
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics data indicates that college tuition prices have 
increased 1,225 percent in the past 36 years (Jamrisko & Kolet, 2014 and Shaffer, Sohl, 
& Steele, 2016) and the costs associated with operating a higher education institution also 
continue to increase. According to a 2016 report published by the Delta Cost Project, 
since 2008 more of the college cost burden was placed on families through higher tuition 
(Desrochers & Hurlburt, 2016).  Therefore, how collegiate athletics are funded and the 
overall impact of having varsity athletics on a campus must be carefully examined. Thus, 
the purpose of this literature review is to define Division I athletics in the context of 
higher education. This will provide the reader with an understanding of the Power Five 
Conferences versus the other conferences, as well as a definition of the Cinderella Story 
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within the NCAA Division I men’s basketball tournament context, and how colleges are 
affected by athletic success. 
Defining the Power Five 
 For the purpose of this literature review, “Power Five” refers to the collegiate 
athletic conferences including the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Southeastern 
Conference (SEC), Big Ten, Big 12, and the Pac-12. For the purpose of this study, the 
BIG EAST, while one of the marquee men’s basketball conferences, is not a Power Five 
conference and will be treated as non-Power Five along with the rest of the Division I 
conferences that also do not sponsor big-time college football like the Power Five. The 
65 schools that are included in the Power Five are listed in Table 1.    
Table 1 Power Five Institutions (NCAA.org) 
 
The Power Five conferences were granted autonomy in 2014 from the NCAA, the 
freedom to create their own rules, with the first legislative cycle beginning in the 2015-16 
academic year. This decision to grant autonomy was done to ensure that these 
conferences would continue to operate in NCAA sponsored Division I athletics and not 
Conference Schools 
ACC Boston College, Clemson, Duke, Florida State, Georgia Tech, 
Louisville, Miami, North Carolina, North Carolina State, 
Pittsburgh, Syracuse, Virginia, Virginia Tech, Wake Forest, 
Notre Dame 
Big 12 Baylor, Iowa State, Kansas, Kansas State, Oklahoma, Oklahoma 
State, TCU, Texas, Texas Tech, West Virginia 
Big Ten Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Michigan State, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Northwestern, Ohio State, Penn State, 
Purdue, Rutgers, Wisconsin 
Pac-12 Arizona, Arizona State, California, UCLA, Colorado, Oregon, 
Oregon State, USC, Stanford, Utah, Washington, Washington 
State 
SEC Alabama, Arkansas, Auburn, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, LSU, 
Mississippi, Mississippi State, Missouri, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas A&M, Vanderbilt 
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form a new governing body all together. Autonomy for these five conferences allows for 
an unprecedented level of benefits for student-athletes, which ultimately means there is 
now an opportunity to add things like food and beverage fueling stations instead of being 
sanctioned with an NCAA violation for providing snacks to student-athletes pre or post 
workouts and practices. Additionally with the autonomy these conferences are in charge 
of determining cost of attendance stipends, insurance benefits for current and former 
student-athletes, staff sizing, and more (NCAA, 2014a). The new autonomy really allows 
voting for these conferences to be conducted based on a school’s self-interest or a 
conference’s self-interest as opposed to the previous structure in which all conferences, 
regardless the size, had the same weighted input.  
This new governance structure includes a 24-person cabinet established for 
oversight of league changes and rule enforcement, while the 32-person council’s purpose 
is the day-to-day policy and legislation enforcement. The difference with this new 
council is the level of involvement of student-athletes, with each of the Power Five 
conferences providing three student-athlete representatives for a total of 15, and then 
each institution receiving one vote. In order for items to be approved, there are two ways 
to pass. First, either 48 of the 80 votes and support from three out of the five conferences, 
or 41 of the 80 votes and four out of the five conferences (NCAA, 2014a).  
The NCAA stands vehemently behind its decision to allow the autonomy for the 
Power Five because they are still required to follow the NCAA’s governing body rules 
for things such as academic standards, transfer eligibility, membership requirements, and 
the number of total scholarships allotted annually (NCAA, 2014a). The NCAA believes 
that this new model allows for better governing of each other and an increased focus on 
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student-athlete well-being by providing student-athletes a direct vote and a voice at every 
stage of the decision making process (NCAA, 2014a). The way the autonomous process 
works, other conferences are able to adopt the same legislation that the Power Five 
passes, and most have indicated they will follow as much as their budgets allow to stay 
competitive for the best student-athletes and coaches, and to prevent the gap between the 
Power Five and everyone else to grow exponentially as described in later sections 
(NCAA, 2014a).  An example of autonomous legislation that has passed was the decision 
in January 2015 to increase the cost of attendance, meaning these five conferences voted 
to allow an athletic scholarship to cover an athlete’s miscellaneous personal expenses and 
transportation (NCAA, 2015a). Other non-Power Five conferences also agreed, many of 
which were private schools and not obligated to share, but 82 of the 129 Football Bowl 
Subdivision schools, the highest level of play, immediately chose to adapt the same cost 
of attendance legislation (Solomon, 2015). It was estimated that these 82 institutions 
would incur an average additional $900,000 per school to cover this cost of attendance 
increase (Solomon, 2015).   
  General spending information from a recent USA Today article on public 
Division I schools stated that total revenue for the 50 public schools in the Power Five 
conferences rose by $304 million in 2015, but spending also rose by $332 million from 
the year before (Brady, Berkowitz, & Upton, 2016). According to the financial 
information that schools annually report to the NCAA, of the 178 public schools in 
Division I conferences outside of the Power Five, revenue increased by $199 million, but 
spending also rose by $218 million (2016). With significant financial benefits and costs 
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associated with making the March Madness tournament, understanding how an institution 
becomes one of the 68 schools in the annual tournament is imperative.  
NCAA and Division I Athletics 
This literature review on the NCAA Division I March Madness tournament was 
conducted from research extending back to the 1980’s when the commercialization of 
college sports significantly increased, but also provides general history of the NCAA. 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in the United States was 
established in 1906 as the sole governing body for intercollegiate athletics in hopes of 
increasing competition and establishing eligibility rules for football and other developing 
sports (NCAA.org). The main objective of the NCAA today is “to maintain 
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as 
an integral part of the student body and, by doing, retain a clear line of demarcation 
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports” (Mitten and Ross, 2014). This 
line has become blurred over the years with national debates and lawsuits involving 
player likeness and compensation, the definition of amateurism, and most recently with 
the formation of the Power Five conferences in Division I athletics and the new 
autonomy policy granted to them by the NCAA.   
The NCAA was split into three divisions in 1973 in hopes of unifying like-
minded campuses in the areas of philosophy, competition, and opportunity. This 
restructuring included Division III, Division II, and Division I, the most competitive and 
highest level of collegiate athletics, sponsoring at least the minimum 14 varsity men’s 
and women’s sports (NCAA, 2014c). Division I campuses have on average the largest 
undergraduate enrollment at 9,743, Division II with 2,540, and Division III with 1,766. A 
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number of other differences exist between the divisions, including the types of 
scholarships allowed for Division I and II only, as DIII is non-scholarship. Division I 
institutions can provide a student with multiyear scholarships, can pay for students to 
finish their bachelor’s or master’s degree even when they finish playing sports, and can 
offer full or partial scholarships that are renewed annually (NCAA, 2014c). Division I 
athletics is understood to be the most competitive, but ranking systems had to be 
developed to help assess and rank top performances.  
 In 1981 the RPI (Ratings Percentage Index) was created as the tool to rank 
basketball team performances, college football had been doing something similar with the 
Associated Press Poll since 1936 (NCAA, 1981). In 1982 the first March Madness 
“selection show” was broadcast as well as the first NCAA media rights agreement with 
CBS for three years at $49.9 million, and in 1985 the 64-team bracket was announced 
and the new CBS agreement was increased to $94.7 million (NCAA, 2018). The NCAA 
Division I men’s basketball tournament was first played in 1939, and a single-elimination 
tournament involving only eight teams has since grown to a nearly month long single-
elimination tournament with 68 participating teams (NCAA, 2018). Throughout the 78-
year history of the NCAA March Madness Tournament, research has increasingly been 
conducted examining the impact high level athletics has on a campus in general. These 
associated statistical figures and financial implications change almost weekly as more 
and more information becomes available.  
While the three divisions have clear differences across multiple categories, there 
are also distinct differences within Division I schools between Football Bowl Subdivision 
(FBS), formally known as I-A, and Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) schools, 
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formally known as I-AA. There are currently 124 FCS schools and 130 FBS schools, and 
it is important to note that there are approximately 97 Division I basketball institutions 
that do not sponsor DI football. This is key when it comes to any public media coverage 
an institution’s football team receives prior to the start of basketball season, as the 
exposure for both the school and the basketball program matter when it comes to 
attracting top coaches and recruits.   
Within these distinct football classifications are institutions that also sponsor 
Division I men’s basketball. The importance of understanding FBS versus FCS schools is 
the financial benefits one has over the other, the financial incentives for an FCS school to 
play at an FBS school, as well as the national attention an FCS institution garners if they 
defeat an FBS school in football or basketball. It is important to note that some FBS 
schools are in non-Power Five conferences, for example University of Central Florida, 
who was denied a spot in the 2017 College Football Playoff because they are not in the 
Power Five (Niesen, 2017). This label matters, and while it is even more challenging now 
to understand with the College Football Playoff, it is important to understand why the 
FBS and FCS classification has such an impact on Division I men’s basketball. The 
College Football Playoff was established in 2014 as an opportunity for the top four teams 
to play in two semifinal bowl games in order to determine the national championship 
opponents. A selection committee ranks the FBS football programs based on strength of 
schedule, performance in conference play and other factors (College Football Playoff, 
2018). The FCS schools compete in a playoff with the 24 best teams competing.  
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The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics was established in 1989 in 
large part to address the changing relationship between collegiate athletics and the 
academic institution.  In one published report the Commission stated:   
An institution of higher education has an abiding obligation to be a 
responsible steward of all the resources that support its activities – 
whether in the form of taxpayers’ dollars, the hard-earned payments of 
students and their parents, the contributions of alumni, or the revenue 
stream generated by athletics programs (Sparvero & Warner, 2013).   
 
Financial responsibility continues to play an integral role on campus decisions, especially 
within athletics, as the NCAA restricts direct payment to student-athletes. Therefore it is 
even more important today that institutions spend the generated revenues in ways that 
benefit the student-athletes, for example in improved facility structures and enhanced 
academic and rehabilitation specialists since they cannot receive direct compensation for 
their athletic performance and/or influence. In another Knight Commission report from 
2010, the data concluded that “the amount spent per athlete in Division I Football Bowl 
Sub-Division (FBS) conferences was 4-11 times greater than the amount spent on 
academics for a full-time enrolled student” (Sparvero & Warner, 2013, p.121).  
Examining specifically the relationships between coaching salaries, operating expenses, 
and recruiting expense and on-the-field success at NCAA DI institutions from data sets 
from 2003 and 2011, the researchers were able to indicate that the institutions with the 
largest operating budgets spent the most across budget categories and for the most part 
were able to sustain these spending habits over time, a major finding. (Sparvero & 
Warner, 2013).  It is important to note that the limitations of spending for a program are 
institutional based, not controlled by the NCAA, thus further emphasizing the spending 
gap between institutions that win.  
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NCAA Division I football postseasons do not yield similar, prolonged underdog 
stories as the ones that exist in men’s basketball each March. Up until 2014 when the 
College Football Playoff (CFP) was instituted, there was the Bowl Championship Series 
(BCS), essentially five bowl games featuring the top ten Football Bowl Subdivision 
(FBS) teams, and essentially only one non-Power Five school was guaranteed 
participation to compete on this national stage each year. Simultaneously, the Football 
Championship Subdivision (FCS), comprised of non-Power Five conferences selected ten 
automatic bids to a similar playoff tournament structure with less media attention and 
fewer sponsorship dollars involved (NCAA, 2016b). Additionally, schools that were 
surprising participants in a bowl game only had one opportunity on a given day for the 
increased media and coverage, unlike the basketball tournament, which takes place over 
multiple weeks and storylines develop over time. While much of the existing research is 
presented in conjunction with major college football data, the information is valuable to 
help establish the basketball landscape in perspective of the entire NCAA Division I 
athletics landscape. In an article published on NCAA.com in February 2017, teams 
ranked 11 or worse that advanced to the Sweet Sixteen or beyond was defined as 
Cinderella’s by this writer’s justification, settling on the 11 or worse seeding after first 
trying to define based on geography, conference size or bid type (Mull, 28 February 
2017). However, this definition eliminates some well-known underdog runs, including 
the 2008 number 10 Davidson run with NBA star Steph Curry. Simply defining the 
Cinderella story as an underdog team going on a run is too loosely defined and negates 
the immediate and very specific impact the unsuspected success can have on a team and a 
school. For the purpose of this study, a Cinderella team is defined as a combination of a 
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few things, a non-Power Five school making the tournament, and/or winning a 
tournament game, with no weight placed on the seeding or type of tournament bid.  
The March Madness Selection Process 
For an institution to be announced on Selection Sunday, the official start of March 
Madness, confirmation that they are one of the best 68 teams in the country comes to 
fruition. The selection committee is responsible for selecting, seeding, and bracketing the 
32 best teams receiving automatic bids for winning their respective conference 
championships, including the five Power Five conferences, five other FBS conferences, 
FBS independents, and 13 FCS conferences, and then the other 32 spots. The selection 
committee’s primary goal in the early rounds is to maximize ticket revenue by making 
sure the better teams play geographically close to their home city (Rishe, Mondello, & 
Boyle, 2014). Committee members are each assigned approximately seven conferences to 
monitor and become experts of throughout the course of the regular season. Members 
spend countless hours evaluating teams and using tools like the RPI, or Ratings 
Percentage Index, to update rankings daily (NCAA, 2015a). It takes into consideration 
factors like wins and losses, strength of schedule, record against top 25 teams, and record 
during last 12 games (NCAA, 2015a).  
The selection into the men’s basketball tournament is an opportunity for both the 
institution and the conference, but it is also a complicated and highly scrutinized process. 
Currently the 32 conference tournament winners receive an automatic bid and the other 
remaining 36 teams are determined by the committee for at-large bids, which is 
administered by a 25-step process enforced by the NCAA, which establishes guidelines 
for evaluation (Shapiro, Drayer, Dwyer & Morse, 2009). In 2005, Greg Shaheen, the 
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NCAA’s vice president of Division I men’s basketball shared the general tools used by 
committee members to evaluate performance for the tournament selection process, 
including the following: “win-loss record, overall RPI, road record, record in last 10 
games, record against teams sorted by RPI, quality wins, quality losses, bad wins, bad 
losses, strength of schedule, and any other circumstances that could have affected results” 
(Shapiro et al., 2009).  In a study conducted of teams that finished in the RPI top 100 
from 1999 to 2007, researchers found that most criticism regarding the selection process 
and decision-making by the committee actually was unwarranted (Shapiro et al., 2009). 
Selections in turn continued to meet the classifications the committee deemed 
performance-based guidelines. Due to the tournament having major financial benefits for 
a conference and an individual college or university, it is not surprising the emphasis 
placed to ensure that committee members are utilizing the proper factors when 
conducting the analysis. Just from these attributes alone, it is easy to understand why 
many argue the selection process has potential biases that can directly influence the 
future of a program, both good and bad.  
The tournament bracket is comprised of the First Four, which are the four play-in 
games involving eight teams that take place over two days following Selection Sunday 
for a chance to advance to the next round (NCAA, 2017c). Additionally there are four 
regions: the South Regional, the West Regional, the East Regional, and the Midwest 
Regional. Each regional has sixteen teams and there are numerous rules enforced to 
properly determine the matchups. For example, teams in the same conference are not 
permitted to play each other if they have previously met three or more times (NCAA, 
2017c). Additionally, a lot of time and consideration is given to the bracket formation to 
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avoid any similarities to the previous two brackets and to prevent sending the same 
schools to further geographic locations (NCAA, 2017c).  
Theoretical Framework  
While athletic success is revered in today’s society, the benefits of national 
attention for a school due to men’s basketball tournament success is not examined 
enough, nor is there a comprehensive and agreeable definition of “athletic success” to 
understand the impact on the greater campus community over time. Additionally, no one 
theory works to describe just how the intercollegiate athletic program success can 
influence the college choice process, and in turn lead to an influx of applicants and 
donations. Therefore a combination of an advertising effect theory, also known as the 
“Flutie Effect,” and a more traditional theory used in the college choice process, 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, work together to establish a theoretical framework for this 
study.  
In a study on the advertising effect due to big-time college basketball one author 
defines the “advertising effect” theory as the highlighted public relations stories produced 
from the successful basketball program and the overall support winning at the most elite 
level brings to the educational mission of an institution (Smith, 2008).  This article 
presumes that the definition of a successful basketball program is one that attracts more 
applicants, thus increasing the academic profile because the institution can be more 
selective about the credentials of the accepted students. Either way, this theory suggests 
the institution gains tangible academic benefits from a successful basketball program 
(Smith, 2008). Smith finds in his empirical study that any advertising boosts as a result of 
spring semester success during March Madness can be visible a year and a half 
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afterwards. This lag in immediate boost to an institution is in part due to the timing of 
application deadlines and acceptances, as the post-March Madness application increases 
occur the following years, not during that same academic year, as seen after big time 
football championships, where students can still decide to attend one of these schools that 
has had recent national stage success. Smith’s research determines that any effects of big-
time athletic programs on the quality of the student body are small, but his study does 
conclude that some colleges and universities use the positive marketing from athletics 
victories to increase revenue streams for various campus services such as dining and 
housing (Smith, 2008). 
Due to the increasing quantity and overall quality of Division I athletic events, 
advertising plays an even greater role in the recruitment process of potential students. 
Individual students place a different emphasis on attending an institution because of 
competitive athletics programs, and in a study examining the “Flutie Effect,” Chung 
looked at how students of different abilities place diverse values on athletic success 
versus academic quality (Chung, 2013). Using market-level/state-level data to infer 
preference for schools by students living in different markets, Chung’s research differed 
from the strictly institutional-level data being used in previous studies (Murphy & 
Trandel, 1994, and Pope & Pope, 2009). Using multiple datasets, Chung used Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) for admissions information, National 
Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) for the majority of the postsecondary education 
information, and multiple sports-reference resources for the athletics data. Chung 
concluded that athletic success has a significant long-term positive effect on future 
applications and the quality of the student applicant, even the strongest students were 
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positively impacted, and athletic effects were greater at public schools, seeing selectivity 
rates improve 9.9 percentage points verses private schools improvement by 4.1 
percentage points (2013). Additionally, Chung’s study defines success as a stock of 
goodwill that will decay over time, meaning, it is not guaranteed annually, but success for 
the purpose of this study is loosely defined with no championship or specific number of 
victories associated, instead positioned as a non-permanent factor.     
Boston College was a less prestigious institution than the school that it is today, 
and some would argue the positive changes the school endured stemmed from the 
football team’s success in 1984 to give the Eagles a 47-45 win over defending national 
champion University of Miami, solidifying the impact of collegiate athletic success on a 
campus community (Johnson, 2006). While the sudden heightened buzz due to Doug 
Flutie’s touchdown pass generated greater knowledge of Boston College, administration 
had already begun their preparations to transform Boston College into a more desirable 
undergraduate destination for prospective students (Johnson, 2006), a very common but 
not often attainable goal. The Flutie Effect, defined as “an increase in exposure and 
prominence of an academic institution due to the success of its athletics program” 
(Chung, 2012, 2),  quickened the timeline to make the changes Boston College had 
decided they would make, which coincided with the increase in faculty hiring, and 
growth in financial aid allotted (Johnson, 2006).  
Enrollment increases at Boston College in the 1980s were on the rise, averaging 
about 15 percent increases each year since the early 1970s. The college was making great 
strides to attract more, and overall stronger academic students by investing in land for 
additional residence halls to reduce the “commuter college” structure (Peterson-Horner & 
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Erikson, 2015). Boston College was working in advance of the “Flutie Effect” to morph 
from the commuter school built from strong catholic roots to a diverse student body 
interacting in a residence hall campus lifestyle, and the “Flutie Effect” positively sped 
this change up.   
While much of the study conducted by Chung was focused on Division I football 
case studies, the research in general further establishes the definition of “Flutie Effect.” 
Named after a specific athletic moment that brought immediate attention to an institution 
similarly Villanova experienced a this effect when they defeated Georgetown to capture 
the 1985 NCAA men’s basketball championship, spurring Villanova into the national 
spotlight (Peterson-Horner and Eckstein, 2015). Villanova became an institution with an 
even stronger sense of spirituality, exposing the national audience to its Catholic mission 
and significantly smaller enrollment as compared to the other well-known basketball 
powerhouses (Taylor, 2016).  
A second theory to consider when analyzing March Madness and the impact it has 
on academic and admission factors of an institution is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
Theory, which suggests that people are motivated to fulfill their basic needs before 
advancing to more advanced ones. This theory plays a prominent role in college choice as 
well as an institutions effort to recruit students. Athletic programs allow for community 
to be established on campus, unifying a diverse student population to cheer and support a 
commonality, in this case a team. As student-athletes expand their interests, involvement 
within the greater campus community, and their role on the team, their needs evolve as 
well. Intercollegiate athletics also provide an avenue for students to feel proud of 
attending an institution, and this pride can also lead to an increase in a student’s sense of 
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prestige, importance, and fulfilling the sense of belonging to something bigger than 
oneself (Brunet, Atkins, Johnson & Stranak, 2013). While not the case for every 
prospective college student, some however do allow athletics and the March Madness 
success of a particular school influence their decision whether or not to attend that 
specific institution.  
Financial Benefits of Making March Madness  
March Madness continues to create a national buzz surrounding Division I men’s 
basketball for the greater part of March into early April, culminating with the crowning 
of a national champion. Among the stories of historically successful basketball programs 
are the stories of the smaller schools with fewer resources and less lucrative coaching 
salaries making an unsuspecting run to and through the tournament. The television 
broadcast coverage to the tournament varies by conference but it is important as fans tune 
in to potential Cinderella teams, and the selection committee familiarizes themselves with 
otherwise unacquainted opponents and programs. For example, the non-Power Five 
Patriot League Conference had19 of its games broadcast on the CBS Sports Network for 
the 2017-18 season (patriotleague.org), while the ACC, a member of the Power Five, had 
all 135 regular season league games broadcasted on an ESPN affiliated network for the 
2017-18 season (theACC.com). Collegiate athletics is a business powered by 
multimillion dollar broadcast rights agreements and ticket sales revenues, especially 
during March Madness. The most recent audited numbers from the NCAA, 2011-2012, 
show that the NCAA had a total $871.6 million in revenue (NCAA, 2016a). The majority 
of this revenue stemming from the 14-year media agreement with CBS Sports and Turner 
Broadcasting for rights to the Division I Men’s Basketball Championship. Long-term 
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agreements have always been a part of the NCAA tournament and steadily have grown to 
massive amounts. In 1982, a three-year deal with CBS was worth $49.9 million, and in 
1991 a $1 billion seven-year deal with CBS was established (NCAA, 2010). The current 
profitable broadcast agreement impacts the 68 teams that make the annual tournament in 
terms of allotted media coverage, but approximately 96 percent of the revenue generated 
from this lucrative deal goes directly to student athlete programing, services, or direct 
distribution to conferences and individual schools (NCAA, 2010).  
The financial benefits of being a Cinderella team in March continue to grow in 
amount annually as broadcast rights increase and other corporate sponsorships develop. 
Being one of the 68 teams in the tournament, a school earns a financial boost, but the 
amounts vary annually based on a six-year span and based on the conference one 
competes in. The exact amount a specific school receives is based on the number of 
teams per conference making it to the tournament, how these teams fare in the 
tournament, as well as how they performed in the previous five years of tournaments, and 
payments are based on a rolling six year average (NCAA, 2016a).  
For example, in the 2015 tournament, every win unit was worth at least $1.6 
million paid over the six years. So for a team in the SEC to make it to the Final Four, that 
once lump sum payout to the individual school is now shared with the other 13 SEC 
schools, and if split evenly, each school receives approximately $560,000 over six years 
(Ingold & Pearce, 2015). Obviously making the NCAA tournament and winning in the 
tournament reaps more benefits, but with this NCAA Basketball Fund, essentially it is no 
longer about the individual team’s performance but rather how a conference fares in the 
tournament. Therefore, it is even more important for non-Power Five schools to have 
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strong conference representation to spread the wealth to smaller conferences as opposed 
to keeping money in the wealthiest five conferences. Again, for smaller, non Power Five 
conferences, this money received for making the tournament, and winning in the 
tournament, constitutes nearly 70 percent of the annual revenue for the conference 
(NCAA, 2016a). Ultimately the more teams a conference can get into the tournament the 
more lucrative the payout over the following six years will be.  
To illustrate just how much of an impact the media exposure and national 
broadcast rights has on institutions, the 2015-2016 Basketball Fund distribution was $205 
million, based on units earned from 2010-2015 (Table 2), specifically with the 
conferences doing the best receiving the greatest financial return: Big Ten $25,820,611; 
American Athletic Conference $24,516,540; Atlantic Coast Conference $20,604,326 
(NCAA, 2016c). Specific to the non Power Five conferences, the Atlantic-10 had 45 units 
earning $11,736,641, the Metro Atlantic Athletic Conference and Patriot Leagues earning 
7 units for $1,825,700, and the Ivy League earning 10 units for $2,608,143 (NCAA, 
2016c).   
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Table 2 Basketball Fund Distributions By Conference 2010-2015 
 
Source: NCAA.org, 2015  
Across media platforms college basketball programs garner the attention for 
colleges and universities who may otherwise not be able to afford the paid advertisement 
and national reach the games afford them. Most of the research regarding the Cinderella 
story in college basketball is more anecdotal in nature and focuses on the immediate 
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benefit to the men’s basketball program and athletics department in ways such as 
enhanced recruiting opportunities, including more general interest in the athletics 
offerings of the institution (Berky, 2012 and Thamel, 2017).  
The implications of March Madness success is institution-specific. For example, 
Director of Athletics at Florida Gulf Coast University, which experienced firsthand in 
2013 the March Madness bliss stated, “it was transformational for our entire school, not 
just our basketball program, not just for our athletic department. We literally had people 
who were coming here to campus to try to get a t-shirt before they all got off the rack” 
(Barrabi, 2015). In 2013 Florida Gulf Coast University became the first number 15-seed 
to ever win two games in the tournament, first upsetting Georgetown followed by San 
Diego State University, and while their Cinderella story ended in the Sweet Sixteen to 
intrastate rival Florida, the positive impact on the FGCU campus was felt immediately, as 
applications jumped 29.9 percent, and licensed athletic merchandise also increased 200 
percent (Berr, 2016).  
The national program visibility provides a unique recruiting opportunity for the 
university public relations and admissions offices, providing a free opportunity to recruit 
talented students from all over the country, not only student-athletes. One study examined 
Davidson College’s 2008 men’s basketball success, resulting in the following:   
(1) the average daily sales at Davidson College Bookstore prior to 
Sunday, March 23, 2008 was approximately $1,700. Daily sales on 
Wednesday, March 26, 2008 (the first day “Sweet 16” t-shirts went on 
sale) totaled $35,000; (2) the percentage increase in transfer inquiries 
received by Davidson’s Admission Office since their second round win 
over Georgetown has been over 1,200 percent, and finally, (3) during the 
month of March 2008, Davidson College saw traffic on their website 
increase 262 percent (Shapiro et al., 2009).  
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While it is unclear in Shapiro et al.’s research if Davidson’s applicant pool was composed 
of a better quality student post Georgetown victory, the 2008 run has propelled the 
institution in a continuous climb athletically and academically.  
Similarly, when George Mason made it to the Final Four in 2006, their bookstore 
which usually recorded around $45,000 in sales for a month sold $876,000 worth of 
merchandise including 32,000 t-shirts alone in the ten days that George Mason defeated 
teams like University of North Carolina and the University of Connecticut (Johnson, 
2006). Additionally, George Mason’s sudden stardom in the higher education market 
spearheaded fundraising growth from $19.6 million to $23.5 million, and a 32 percent 
increase in the capital campaign goal (Baker, 2008). It is worth noting that these 
examples are case studies and other factors could also be at play here. While there have 
been studies that focus on the effects of athletic successes on institutional fundraising 
(Stinson & Howard, 2008), research specific to measuring the impact of March Madness 
appearances on fundraising do not exist.  
With only seven athletic programs in the entire country that do not rely on some 
form of state subsidies to operate, it is no surprise that 23 of the 68 teams from the 2013-
14 March Madness tournament either lost money or just broke even across all sports, not 
just basketball (Barrabi, 2015). The seven schools that do not rely on some form of state 
subsidies includes LSU, Nebraska, Ohio State, Oklahoma, Penn State, Purdue, and Texas, 
all of which are Power Five schools. Based on numbers from the 2014-2015 basketball 
season, Kentucky’s undefeated regular season earned them $23.7 million in revenue on 
$16.2 million in expenses, Villanova earned $10.5 million in revenue compared to $7.3 
million in expenses, and Wisconsin earned $19.4 million in revenue compared with $7.6 
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million in expenses (Berr, 2015). While basketball is oftentimes more profitable than 
other sports such as men’s lacrosse and football due to relatively low operating costs and 
small roster sizes, basketball coaches are still paid high salaries, teams take private and 
chartered flights to most away games, and no expense is spared when it comes to meals, 
gear, and the overall student-athlete experience.  
Media Exposure and Corporate Sponsorship 
 The National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I Men’s Basketball 
Tournament receives fervent support from fans, universities, and the many sponsors 
associated with collegiate basketball each March. Viewership numbers are ultimate 
indicators of the intense power this tournament holds and the monetary impact it can have 
on an institution as a whole. Shapiro et al.’s study emphasized the power of March 
Madness broadcasts, when the 2008 final between the University of Memphis and 
University of Kansas saw more than 19.5 million viewers, which was greater than the 
National Basketball Association finals viewership (17.5 million) and the National 
Hockey League finals (6.8 million) in comparison during that same year (Shapiro et al., 
2009).  
Many Division I administrators view their men’s basketball program as not only 
potential revenue-generating subunits but also platforms for their overall educational 
message to reach the greater public. Significant research indicates the irreplaceable 
benefit the mass media advertising has on an entire academic institution, and Chung 
(2012) writes that the best media-advertising tool for an institution is through athletics 
because of the mass market reach, thus the importance of an institution supporting the 
athletics department. One particular study conducted in 2008 used a mixed-method 
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approach to determine if the broadcast agreements associated with the NCAA Division I 
men’s basketball tournament aligned with the educational mission of collegiate athletics, 
or if they were controlled by the rights holder and interfered with NCAA permissible 
messaging. Using the 2006 tournament broadcasts, the researchers sought to determine 
how much control the NCAA has in the messages conveyed throughout each broadcast, 
or if the rights holder, in this case CBS, controls the messaging (Southall et al., 2008). It 
was determined that additional research on this needs to occur for a true conclusion to be 
made, but Southall et al.’s research did find that the NCAA March Madness broadcasts 
have had a more commercial feel rather than educational. For example, very little 
information about the university, even using the proper school names has not been part of 
broadcasts. Therefore, this study showed that for almost as long as the NCAA has 
existed, commercial logic was at the forefront of all strategic decision-making, not the 
educational logic like the NCAA claimed. Broadcasts focused on “program” references, 
athletic nicknames, and highlighting the athletic brand, not the educational platform 
(Southall et al., 2008). Southall et al.’s research suggested that for all the attention a 
national broadcast gains for an institution, the majority of the attention is still focused on 
the commercial side of sports, not the educational highlights of the institution. Today’s 
high profile basketball programs provide more than a traditional sporting event and 
instead provide an advertising and public relationship vehicle for institutions to promote 
their basketball program and greater campus as a whole, because Division I men’s 
basketball has a fundamental worth to broadcasters, with a reach extending from smaller 
collegiate sport cable stations to major national networks (Southall et al., 2008).   
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Corporate sponsorship at Virginia Commonwealth University managed by IMG 
College saw a major increase after the team’s deep postseason run in 2011.  The 
University had 126 total licensees to begin the year, but saw that number jump to 151, 
more than doubling the school’s licensing royalties (Barrabi, 2015).  Along with 
corporate sponsorship increases, private booster donations also drastically increased. In 
particular, George Mason saw its online registry of alumni donors increase by 52 percent, 
and as “giving numbers go up, donations go up and they’re able to get critical projects 
done to try to sustain the success of their programs,” said IMG College President Tim 
Pernetti (Barrabi, 2015). 
Athletic Success and Potential Campus-Wide Financial Benefits   
In hopes of determining the actual relationship between big time collegiate 
athletics wins and the greater impact on a campus community, one study in 2013 by 
Sparvero and Warner explored the relationship between spending on coaching salaries, 
operating expenses, and recruiting expenses and the on-field success at Division I 
institutions. This study aimed to understand the correlation between winning and what it 
costs to win. In order to study this correlation, Sparvero and Warner define “success” of 
an athletic program through the most visible way, the on field wins and losses. Using the 
Equity in Athletics Disclosure database from the U.S. Department of Education, 2012, 
and the Learfield Sports Directors’ Cup rankings, also from 2012, Sparvero and Warner 
used data collected from 2002-2003 of 221 NCAA Division I programs, and then again in 
2010-2011 from 227 NCAA Division I programs. This multi-year approach allowed for 
any trends to be explored and this study only included the schools that had earned 
Director’s Cup points for that specific year (Sparvero & Warner, 2013). The findings 
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concluded that a strong, positive correlation does exist between winning and what it costs 
to win, and that athletic department spending is consistent across salaries, recruiting, and 
operating expenses, reflecting that the increased spending did lead to an increase of 
success (Sparvero & Warner, 2013). 
Research has shown March Madness success can provide noticeable financial 
benefits to the institution as well as an improvement in the quantity and quality of an 
institution’s applicants (Barrabi, 2015; Chressanthis & Grimes, 1993; Frank, 2004; Goff, 
2000; McEvoy, 2005; Pope & Pope, 2009; Toma & Cross, 1998), increased licensing 
deals and additional interest from corporate sponsors (Hadley, 2000; Lanter & Hawkins, 
2013; Smith, 2008). High-profile men’s basketball and football programs oftentimes 
provide the possibility of additional benefits for the greater institution because of the 
athletic success. D. Randall Smith conducted a study focusing on the relationship 
between big-time athletics and higher education, using the entire 348 private and public 
colleges and universities at the time sponsoring NCAA Division I men’s basketball. In 
particular, Smith focused on tuition and the impact athletic success placed on in state and 
out of state students. Out of state tuition continues to provide a significant source of 
revenue and high profile athletic success assists with the attraction of many out of state 
students (Smith, 2012). It was estimated that the University of Wisconsin, Madison 
would have generated $2,483,740 in out-of-state tuition revenue for each additional 
NCAA tournament game played between 1993 and 1997 (Smith, 2012). But such 
financial numbers are very particular to the institution, as during the same time frame the 
University of Illinois would have been able to capture only $6,378 from out of state 
students for each additional NCAA tournament game played (Smith, 2012). The 
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difference between Wisconsin and Illinois is significant because of Wisconsin’s 
commitment to raising tuition during this time frame where basketball was winning. 
Smith’s research examines the myth that tuition levels would need to be adjusted based 
on the athletic success, and also raises the point that tuition and the athletic success 
relationship needs further development.   
Smith defined a basketball breakout season as “winning over half the games for 
the first time in at least 13 years, making the NCAA basketball tournament for the first 
time in at least 13 years, or winning the NCAA tournament for the first time in at least 13 
years” and used an athletic success variable in his research (2012). There was a consistent 
finding that out of state students paid a higher premium for attending a research 
university, but research also indicated that tuition only increased at private institutions, 
not public, and in fact public institution for in-state tuition saw room, board, and fees 
reduced by about $1,000 because of the association with a Power Five Conference 
(Smith, 2012). While the Power Five did not officially form and gain autonomous power 
in the NCAA until 2014, these five conferences because of football operated under 
similar means well before 2014.    
 Athletic success financially impacts how institutions are able to spend money and 
impact the overall student-athlete experience. Spending within the major conferences 
(SEC, Big Ten, Pac-12, ACC, Big 12, and included in this study is the BIG EAST) is 6-
12 times greater per student-athlete than spending on each student at these various 
institutions, roughly amounting to more than $100,000 per student-athlete (Lanter & 
Hawkins, 2013). Such discrepancies in spending between athletes and non leads to 
greater questions about spending habits on campus, and if schools are doing what is best 
! 49 
for the campus as a whole with the increased revenues from athletics. The financial 
model of intercollegiate athletics impacts all students on campus and the associated 
educational opportunities and experiences. It is important to note that at many non-Power 
Five institutions, athletics is funded in part through the usage of student fees (Hobson & 
Rich, 2015; & Smith, 2012). 
 Using state appropriations data from the Grapevine Project from 1983-2007, and 
the Massey Ratings, which reported the win-loss records for basketball teams each 
season, an empirical model was developed to analyze the 117 schools, which includes 
Division I-A and DI-AA programs, which corresponds with today’s FBS and FCS 
categories, for which they could obtain complete data (Alexander & Kern, 2010). This 
study further emphasized the idea that the division and conference a university or college 
is in matters to the overall state appropriations associated with winning. Results of this 
study showed that institutions with winning basketball programs received on average 
more state appropriations (2010). 
 It is a well-known fact that athletic departments spend a lot of money, especially 
in the Division I landscape. To better understand the trends of athletic spending, a model 
to examine NCAA Division I athletic programs from 2006-2011 was created (Hoffer et 
al., 2015). The model includes a utility-maximizing athletic department decision maker, 
most likely the Athletic Director. The AD utility is based off of the factors including total 
coaching staff, prestige, and total revenues generated by the athletic department. 
Essentially this model acts to assume that investments, whether in fixed assets or in 
athletics terminology such as in investing in more qualified coaches and facilities, the 
prestige of the athletic department will also increase. In this model Universities that are 
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successful on the playing surface typically generate revenues through concession sales, 
parking, television broadcast fees, alumni and public donations, licensed merchandise 
sales, ticket sales, and making it to high-profile intercollegiate games.  
 This study looks at the 207 Division I public colleges and universities between 
2006-2011 from the NCAA College Athletics Finances database, indicating that the real 
athletic department expenditure grew between 3% and 6% annually (Hoffer et al., 2015). 
Additionally, analyzing the spending in the Power Five conferences (Big 12, Big Ten, 
ACC, SEC, and Pac-12), these conferences spent approximately four times more than the 
average athletic department spending (Hoffer et al., 2015). This research concluded that 
the spending by one athletic department greatly influences the spending of another and 
this arms race will continue to escalate as institutions compete for the best coaches, the 
best student-athletes to perform on the field, and in turn the attention of the general 
student body, faculty, staff, and the surrounding community. For the non Power Five 
institutions, this arms race is a cause for concern because there are limitations to these 
institutions’ budgets and they cannot spend the way these Power Five conferences can.   
An example of a non Power Five school that has achieved success but has also 
been challenged to continue to perform at a high level without possessing the same 
resources as Power Five schools is Davidson College. Davidson has returned to the 
Division I men’s basketball NCAA Tournament three times since its initial Cinderella run 
in 2008, including two conference championships in three years from 2012-2014, and 
making the move from the Southern Conference to the more competitive Atlantic-10 
Conference (Barrabi, 2015). In another article, Shapiro writes, “why should an institution 
whose primary devotion to education and scholarship devote so much effort to 
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competitive athletics” (Shapiro, 2005), leaving one to ask the question where is the line 
drawn between decisions for the betterment of the academic institution, or the betterment 
for this unique population of high profile scholarship student-athletes, but also how 
valuable a successful athletic program can be for a school.  
 Despite the number of Division I men’s basketball programs throughout the 
country, the number of Cinderella Stories with significant impacts on the campus and the 
team are limited. Research exists that focuses specifically on a few programs, especially 
the teams in the 2000’s, but does not look at the greater picture. While case studies add to 
the overall understanding of the positive impact on a specific campus, they limit the 
generalizations of previously unknown programs making a Cinderella run on the national 
stage. Gonzaga is an institution that went from a Cinderella team in March of 1999, 
making a dramatic run to the Elite Eight (quarter finals), to a mainstay in the AP top 25 
polling annually. Even before that, Gonzaga became the first team to follow its initial 
success with a Sweet 16 appearance the following two years (Anderson & Birrer, 2011). 
The success Gonzaga experienced has allowed for an increased national presence, for 
example the 2009-10 nonconference schedule included eight nationally televised games 
on the major sports networks of ESPN, ESPN2, and CBS (Anderson & Birrer, 2011). 
With greater national recognition, better players were committing to Gonzaga annually, 
and more basketball success followed.  
 Gonzaga University has seen an almost doubled enrollment, including two times 
as many out of state students, likely due to the success of the basketball program 
(Anderson & Birrer, 2011). Furthermore, the donations to Gonzaga’s Bulldog (athletics) 
Club increased from approximately $60,000 in 1998 to $1,000,000 after the team’s Elite 
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Eight appearance (Anderson & Birrer, 2011). The subsequent financial support has 
directly impacted the facilities and improvements to the Gonzaga athletics programs and 
resources in general. This study conducted by Anderson and Birrer look at what 
facilitates the Gonzaga success by framing the study through the 1991 VRIO framework, 
which stands for Value, Rareness, Imitability, and Organization. One of the key 
perspectives from the VRIO on Gonzaga’s men’s basketball successes was that many of 
their players lacked the elite skills the major basketball programs attracted, but instead 
possessed the intangibles that enabled them to compete at a high level (Anderson & 
Birrer, 2011). Similar to the decisions other Cinderella schools, Gonzaga’s national 
prominence in the national media allowed the campus as a whole to capture the attention 
of a greater number and broader range of potential students, athletes, and donors. 
University admissions office data showed almost doubling of both the entering and out of 
state students between 1997 and 2007 (Anderson & Birrer, 2011), increasing total 
enrollment to over 4,000 undergraduate from the previous 2,800. Additionally, Gonzaga 
merchandise flew off the shelves, as the bookstore tripled its profit to nearly $1.2 million 
during the 1997 to 2007 span, while concurrently the number of televised games 
increased from 1 to 31 (Anderson & Birrer, 2011). In an essay written by ESPN 
basketball analysis and commentator, Jay Bilas, he was quoted as saying “…Gonzaga 
burst onto the (national) scene and stayed there…no team from the mid-major level had 
ever done it in the modern game” (2007).      
 Gonzaga, like other Cinderella storied programs understood the challenge of 
sustaining the initial success, and head coach Few said, “it’s so much harder to continue 
success than it is to make that initial run” (Anderson & Birrer, 2011). Gonzaga’s athletic 
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department made strategic decisions to ensure the success from their March Madness run 
was sustainable. They committed to the retention of their successful coaching staff, use 
the financial support to improve the facilities and program costs across varsity sports 
platforms, and to increase and promote the number of televised games against national 
high profile teams. Stemming from Gonzaga’s 1999, 2000, and 2001 NCAA tournament 
successes, the institution was able to raise $25 million to fund the new basketball-only 
training facility for both the men’s and women’s programs (Anderson & Birrer, 2011). 
Additional positive benefits from the March Madness success included chartered flights 
for both men’s and women’s basketball teams, new stadiums and facilities for other 
sports, including baseball and soccer, and agree to a 10-year multi-million dollar media 
rights agreement with IMG College to handle all corporate sponsorships and media 
exposure (Anderson & Birrer, 2011). This has all ultimately helped continue the growth 
of a competitive program, while successfully managing all the moving parts along the 
way, all because of the initial 1999 unexpected success in March.   
Quantity and Quality of Applicants and College Choice 
Many university policy makers believe that highly visible intercollegiate athletic 
success increases both the quantity and quality of prospective student applications, as 
well as helps to strengthen a school’s financial and academic standing (Peterson-Horner 
& Eckstein, 2015).  Prospective students react to what they see on television and on 
additional media platforms such as social media.  The huge stadiums packed with rowdy 
fans, the conference and rivalries a team competes against, even what the uniforms look 
like all greatly impact a student’s overall opinion of intercollegiate athletics at a 
particular institution. Additional research has shown that athletics is oftentimes the front 
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porch of the university and prospective students tend to react to the glitz and glam before 
the academic and career services an institution provides (Peterson-Horner & Eckstein, 
2015; McClusky, 2011; McEvoy, 2005). Institutional rankings can influence the 
perception of prospective students and athletic recruits, as well as donors who are willing 
to provide financial support (Fisher, 2009). Athletics can impact the reach and audience 
that a university may not otherwise have, and if operated correctly, can influence 
prospective students who may not have even considered the institution initially (Fisher, 
2009).   
   So many campus resources are devoted to collegiate athletics in part because of 
potential revenues associated with the high profiled sports, but also because drawing 
people to a campus around the positive perception of a successful athletics program adds 
to the development of the overall institutional brand.  At many large universities in the 
United States, spectator sports are central to campus life and the overall campus 
community (Martin & Christy, 2010). Even at smaller, private institutions, such as 
Davidson or Villanova, athletics, in particular men’s basketball, is greatly valued and the 
success and successful players that both programs have had continues to attract students 
and student-athletes alike. Building a brand in higher education is more complicated 
today than ever before as the space is extremely competitive with institutions vying for 
the top faculty, students, administrators, donors, coaches, facilities, and student-athletes. 
Schools spend hundreds of thousands of dollars each year in an attempt to differentiate 
from the others and carve their own unique niche in an increasingly competitive market.   
Schools undergoing a Cinderella run view drastic and sudden change to their 
online footprint. For example, Florida Gulf Coast University experienced high traffic to 
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the school’s website and social media during their Cinderella run, which resulted in a 39 
percent jump in applications, including a 68 percent boost to out-of-state applicants in 
2014, a year following the Sweet 16 run (Barrabi, 2015). Additionally, the accepted 
freshmen class of students averaged two points more on the ACT scores as compared to 
the previous year (Barrabi, 2015).    
 Similarly, George Mason University saw their numbers increase after their 2006 
March Madness run, including a 54 percent spike in out-of-state applications, which 
directly benefits an institution because out of state students pay a higher tuition rate than 
those in state (Barrabi, 2015). This element is key for admissions officers to continue to 
market to out of state students while major basketball games are underway since the 
statistics show that winning has a direct positive correlation with increased applications. 
Athletic Director of Davidson College in North Carolina, Jim Murphy, echoed similar 
sentiments after their 2008 run when the school advanced past the first round for the first 
time since 1969, making it all the way to the Elite Eight. Speaking about the men’s 
basketball national tournament attention, Murphy said that instead of having to describe 
Davison to people, “it opened doors in all our sports…rather than having to describe 
Davidson College in North Carolina, the recruits and coaching candidates knew where 
Davidson was” (Barrabi, 2015).  Additional positive impacts included a rise in 
merchandise sales, season ticket sales increases, and more corporate sponsorship and 
licensing interest at Davidson (Barrabi, 2015).  
Interestingly few, if any, questions on higher education national surveys are 
dedicated to better understanding the impact athletics has on the overall college choice of 
a student. Athletics assist with the broader college choice process for a student because 
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they are highly visible, many games are played in front of a national audience, and can 
expose students directly to an atmosphere and culture that they otherwise may not have 
known existed. Students select an institution for a number of reasons generally, but many 
decide based on limited information more often than not coming from what they see on 
television (Toma & Cross, 1997; Hossler & Gallagher, 1987), or on social media 
(Braddock, Lv, & Dawkins, 2008; and Jones, 2009). Broad research has shown that 
students may actually apply to a school strictly because of a recent attention-generating 
event, or due to a high-profile college sporting event, which also aids as a powerful 
recruiting tool (Pope & Pope, 2014; Roberts & Lattin, 1997; Manrai & Andrews, 1998). 
Research by Siegfried and Getz (2006) also indicated that recruitment of top students 
matters to many schools and the college rankings systems, and high profile athletic 
success can oftentimes lead to better students being attracted to what’s perceived to be a 
more high profile institution.   
An empirical study that supported the anecdotal research mentioned above, Pope 
and Pope (2008) used three datasets to conduct their empirical analysis of institutions 
who compete in Division I basketball, the highest level of collegiate competition, or 
Division I-A football, the top division now known as the Football Bowl Subdivision, are 
broken down into sports rankings used to measure athletic success, school characteristics 
including the number of applications received, average SAT score and enrollment size, 
and number of SAT scores sent to each institution.  Results from the study conducted 
between 1998-2003 and roughly 300 schools suggested that by being one of the 64 teams 
in the NCAA tournament, an institution saw roughly a 1% increase in applications the 
following year, making it to the Sweet Sixteen saw a 3% increase, making it to the Final 
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Four was a 4-5% increase, and winning the tournament saw a 7-8% increase (Pope & 
Pope, 2008).   
 Results from the Pope and Pope study with regards to the SAT database indicated 
that lower scoring SAT applicants (less than 900) responded to a winning basketball 
program nearly twice as much as the higher SAT scoring students: “those schools that 
win the NCAA basketball tournament, see an 18% increase a year later in SAT scores 
less than 900, a 12% increase in scores between 900 and 1100, and a 8% increase in 
scores over 1100” (Pope & Pope, 2008, p. 20).  Overall the results of this study supported 
the idea that athletic success increases the quantity of applicants to an institution, but not 
necessarily the quality (Pope & Pope, 2008).     
This same Pope and Pope study found that there was evidence that both football 
and basketball success could impact the number of applications received by a school (2-
15% range depending on the sport, level of success, and type of institution, and modest 
impacts on the quality of the student measured by SAT scores (Pope & Pope, 2008). Pope 
and Pope define athletic success by specific indicators, including the AP College Football 
Poll for the football success, and for basketball they used the March Madness rounds of 
64, 16, 4, and championship to indicate the proxy of a basketball team’s success (Pope & 
Pope, 2008). This research also found that schools were able to increase tuition and fees 
because of the increased enrollments.  In particular, their research found that schools with 
basketball success received an increase in applications and were able to be more selective 
in the students they enrolled and some private schools increased tuition rates because 
they were able to benefit from an increase in applications due to basketball success (Pope 
& Pope, 2008).   
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In a paper examining the impact on first year enrollment at Division I institutions 
based upon winning, television broadcast coverage, and post-season play over a 21 year 
period, drew the conclusion that winning does attract students but that post-season play 
and broadcast coverage had minimal impact (Chressanthis & Grimes, 1993). One could 
argue that such results today would most likely be different, as potential students are 
consuming everything online and via television. In a 1982 study by Allen and Peters, the 
authors found the decision of first-year students at DePaul University in Chicago were 
greatly impacted by the success of their men’s basketball team (Allen & Peters, 1982). 
However, if one knows anything about college basketball today, one could assume 
students are not enrolling at DePaul for this same reason. 
Toma and Cross (1998) conducted a study of the impact of winning 
championships on the applications of undergraduate students. Examining year-to-year 
and multiyear changes, Toma and Cross were able to determine that athletic success 
positively impacted the college choice process. Looking specifically at the time period of 
1979-1992, Toma and Cross measured the success teams had that won national 
championships in football or men’s basketball, then congruently looked at comparable 
institutions to determine if there were any increases or decreased due to the national 
championship won by another institution. Toma and Cross defined the comparable 
institutions by working with the admissions and institutional research staff from each 
championship school to identify the four or five peer institutions they viewed as their 
main competitors. These peer schools drew from similar pools of applicants, had roughly 
the same academic reputation, size, similar geographic area, and similar athletic program 
(Toma & Cross, 1998). This study does suggest that the intercollegiate athletic success 
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has a positive impact on the search and choice of students, and can positively impact 
young kids who are college sports fans at a young age.  
 The timeframe in which this study was conducted is from 1979-1992 and 11 
different Division I men’s basketball institutions won the NCAA National Tournament 
within these years, with Louisville, Indiana, North Carolina, and Duke winning twice 
each. Basketball’s national champion used to be crowned in late March, but now early 
April, impacting admissions numbers and applications numbers to spike the following 
academic year (Toma & Cross, 1998). To emphasize the impact winning a championship 
has on admissions, Toma and Cross compared the numbers to peer schools within the 
same geographic region. Ten schools experienced some increase in applications 
following the NCAA men’s basketball championship, with only one school seeing a 
substantial spike relative to winning the championship. Michigan’s 1989 championship 
saw a 29% increase in applications in the year following, while peer schools saw 
substantial declines in applications, including Texas (20%), UCLA (8%), and Michigan 
State (11%) (Toma & Cross,1998).  
 In a more recent empirical study conducted by Pope and Pope in 2014, again, 
research showed that athletic success at an institution had a large impact on the student 
application process and could be attributed to the likeliness to apply to a school 
immediately following an attention-generating event, such as winning NCAA men’s 
basketball tournament games (Pope & Pope, 2014). Media exposure acts as a high-
powered recruiting tool for institutions. For example, those students interested in 
following college basketball may not be the exact applicants an admissions department 
wants to accept. Therefore, the type of students schools accept after such athletic success 
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is important to analyze, which Pope and Pope successfully do. Pope and Pope found that 
there is a large and statistically significant increase in the number of students sending 
their SAT scores to schools with recent basketball success in the NCAA tournament. For 
example, if a school made it to the Final Four, there was an increase in sent SAT scores 
by 6-8% the following year (Pope & Pope, 2014).  
 Research has shown that many high school students are impacted by the recent 
athletic success of various institutions, and this impacts their decision making process. 
Pope and Pope (2014) found that the larger impact of sports success on the student 
selection process was on out of state students, as well as males, blacks, and students 
would played sports in high school. Using a regression discontinuity design, Pope and 
Pope analyze the NCAA basketball tournament to measure the impact of barely winning 
and advancing, which they determined received a significant increase in applications due 
to performance, but the win had no guarantee of more success in the future. Pope and 
Pope’s research concludes that an institution with a successful basketball year receives an 
increase in sent SAT scores the following year. In particular, a school invited to the 
NCAA Basketball Tournament can expect a 2%-11% increase in sent SAT scores (Pope 
& Pope, 2014).  
 Very little research has been conducted on the opinions of whether or not 
administrators and faculty actually view athletic success, such as winning a conference 
championship or finishing a season with a winning record, as larger signals of 
institutional quality. One article examined many factors people have associated with the 
“on field” success, such as increases in number of applicants, higher giving rates and 
larger donations, and higher retention rates (Mulholland, et al., 2014). The hypothesis of 
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this particular paper suggests that educational quality and many of its components, such 
as teaching, performance, and research quality, are difficult to measure, whereas athletic 
performance is not, and is largely measured by wins versus losses (Mulholland, et al., 
2014). Interestingly, this article cites a few other studies that have also stated the 
importance of athletic participation enhancing future earnings, because of educating 
students on things like teamwork, leadership, and strategy, so to some extent, institutional 
support of collegiate athletics makes sense (Mulholland, et al., 2014; Long & Caudill, 
1991; Shulman & Bowen, 2001).  
 Mulholland et al.’s research hypothesis was that athletic performance is a signal 
that administrators and faculty can use to measure the university’s administrative quality, 
financial strength, and overall academic prestige (2014). Ultimately their research did 
prove that administrators and faculty should view an institution as being of greater 
quality if they have successful athletics programs and their research did show that 
performance matters (Mulholland et al., 2014). Many would argue that a school should 
not be analyzed based on athletic success alone, but in today’s revenue structured higher 
education setting, it is no wonder the athletics department is gaining traction. 
 Many factors influence the overall determination whether or not athletics has a 
positive impact on the campus as a whole, and data determining if the impact is positive 
or negative varies by the researcher, the study, and the years involved. In hopes of 
determining more specifically the impact athletics has on the academic institution and the 
key decision makers, Brian Goff’s research examines empirical data looking at the 
university-wide effects that intercollegiate athletics. The main conclusions this research 
found included was that most Division I-A football and top Division I men’s basketball 
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programs earned greater revenues than expenses, and significant athletic success can 
substantially increase national exposure for the entire university (Goff, 2000). While 
there are many intangible benefits to having successful athletics programs part of a 
campus community, many collegiate athletics programs are operating in the red.  
Fan Expectations and Student Expectations 
 One of the challenges that the sudden success produces for these Division I men’s 
basketball programs is the expectation from the casual fan and the student fan that annual 
NCAA Tournament runs will become the norm. At some schools student fees cover the 
cost of their ticket to attend these sell-out games, yet there may still be a lottery 
associated for an actual ticket into the game, and at other institutions entering a lottery or 
camping out in a tent for days to gain access to a student section ticket become the norm 
when a team is winning. Unfortunately the reality is that unless an institution is 
established in advance with the resources to sustain and maintain the success, it takes 
time. Duke men’s basketball is an example of an institution expected to win year after 
year, and with 39 NCAA tournament appearances, 16 Final Fours, and 5 National 
Championship titles, it is understandable why fans continue to have high expectations 
(NCAA, 2010b). The FGCU Athletic Director stated, “there are expectations now that far 
outweigh the resources that we currently have. …we very much outkicked our coverage 
when we went to the Sweet 16” (Barrabi, 2015). Sudden rises in national tournament 
attention also pose challenges to the scheduling process, as some teams find others do not 
want to put them on the schedule in fear of a loss, limiting the opportunity to play up to 
some of these larger schools with greater financial payouts. Most recently the ACC and 
Big10 have announced schedule changes to their in-conference men’s basketball 
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schedules, meaning hosting, and paying, smaller schools to travel to them in a non-
conference early season matchup might not happen (Goren, 2017). Retaining head 
coaches also poses a financial burden on these institutions, as it becomes difficult to 
justify the huge salary versus funneling some of the money back to the campus, to 
academic programs, and even to assist other varsity athletic programs. Not to mention 
mid-major teams cannot match the money offered by Power Five coaches, so if a non-
Power Five has a talented men’s basketball coach, more often than not they leave for the 
larger conference and the higher salary. Only recently has research been conducted to 
examine the colossal coaching salaries and the impact on the greater academic campus 
community (Sparvero & Warner, 2013; Jones, 2013; Colbert & Eckard, 2015; Farmer & 
Pecorino, 2010). These studies concluded that the large coaching salaries schools are 
paying do not directly correlate with more success or victories.    
Colleges and universities with successful Division I athletics programs year after 
year expose students and alumni to an increase in student activities and social lives, 
including Greek Life organizations, post-game social life, and an overall spectator 
experience mirrored by nothing else, most of which can be seen through facility 
upgrades, enhanced campus spaces, and programing associated with or surrounding high 
profile sporting events (Clotfelter, 2011). Some research about the overall student-life 
benefits from having athletics on campus exists, but to the extent that Division I athletics 
positively impact the entire campus culture is undetermined by the research. The tailgate 
culture from professional sports is mirrored to a degree at many of these institutions that 
frame high level athletics as a uniting social scene on campus and an essential part of 
their entire collegiate experience and alumni (Fisher, 2009).  Fisher writes:  
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The common notion in higher education is that everything is easier when 
an institution is recognized.  It can recruit more accomplished students and 
more noteworthy faculty, which only cause its prestige to further increase.  
Similarly, it can attract more resources through fundraising, and perhaps 
even research and appropriations.  Whether these are real outcomes or 
simply perceived, senior administrators tend to believe them to be true 
(Fisher, 2009).       
 
National exposure can positively impact an institution, but the bigger question is exactly 
how so, because some of these positive changes can be merely in response to that 
institution being perceived as the “hot” school of the moment, not just a desired location 
due to recent athletic achievement.    
Conclusion  
 
 In a time where student-athlete time demands, and the allocation of increasing 
revenue dollars continue to be hot national topics in the collegiate athletics landscape, it 
is important to note the NCAA’s Fundamental Policy states, “…to maintain 
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the education program and the athlete as an 
integral part of the student body” (NCAA, 2012b, p.1). It is an ongoing debate whether 
college athletics positively impacts a campus, and if so, in what manner, and is it 
sustainable?  However, because of the revenues attributed to winning at the highest level 
of sports and on the national stage, college sports will continue to impact higher 
education as a whole. Research has shown that high profile athletics can contribute 
positively to the greater campus as a whole, including increased donations (Tucker, 2004; 
Frank, 2004), applications (Chressanthis & Grimes, 1993; McEvoy, 2005), institutional 
rankings (Fisher, 2009), higher achieving students (Chung, 2012) and state appropriations 
(Sigelman & Bookheimer, 1983; Alexander & Kern, 2010), and another one of those 
possibilities is the impact on graduation rates (Tucker, 2004, and Rishe, 2003).   
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 This dissertation will attempt to highlight the key factors and significant results 
that appear consistent across the Cinderella storylines of NCAA Division I Men’s 
Basketball. Additionally, this research will compare these non-Power Five institutions 
with unsuspecting tournament success with similar institutions that did not make the 
tournament to compare the significance of their successful run. With great disparity in the 
landscape of Division I athletics between the Power Five conferences and all others, this 
research will attempt to highlight the gaps in the collegiate athletics literature with a 
focus on non-Power Five institutions. My proposal on how I plan to accomplish this is 
outlined in Chapter three.   
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODS  
 
 The purpose of this study was to examine how making the NCAA Division I 
men’s basketball tournament and/or winning a game in the tournament impacts a non-
Power Five institution and its campus. This dissertation is quantitative in nature, using 
data primarily from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) and 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) website and associated athletics 
resources.  
Previous literature in the area of NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball has 
identified variables such as number of applications, quality of the applicants, and 
donations received that are affected by a school’s athletic success (Baker, 2008; Chung, 
2012; Shapiro et al., 2009; Smith, 2012). This study looks specifically at these variables 
together, and previous literature has not examined the impact both immediately and that 
felt over time, when a non-Power Five conference team makes the annual March 
Madness tournament, and/or wins at least a game in the tournament, with no weight 
placed on the seed. Strategically my definition of Cinderella Story is broader than the 
definition most typically used, as I am looking at a team of any seed with low status 
unexpectedly achieving success, to provide an opportunity to analyze exactly what, if 
anything, benefits from a school’s men’s basketball team making the NCAA Division I 
tournament. These specific seeds for the years 2003-2012 are displayed in Table 3, 
indicating just how infrequently non-Power Five teams had five seeds or higher. This 
distribution of seeds for all non-Power Five conference teams throughout the 2002-2013 
tournaments helps to justify the broader definition of Cinderella, since seeds typically 
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were much higher for non-Power Five Schools and it really does not matter what exactly 
the seed was. 
Table 3 Number of Non-Power Five Teams Seeded Each Tournament 
Year Seeds 
 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
‘03 4 3 3 3 3 3 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 0 
‘04 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 
‘05 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 4 1 1 3 0 1 0 
‘06 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 3 1 3 1 3 0 1 0 3 
‘07 5 3 4 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 0 
‘08 5 4 3 4 4 1 3 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 
‘09 5 4 4 3 2 4 0 2 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 3 
‘10 5 4 4 4 4 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 0 3 2 1 
‘11 6 4 4 4 4 3 0 2 3 1 4 1 1 2 2 2 
‘12 6 4 4 4 4 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 1 2 0 1 
  
In order to provide a comprehensive study, it examines specifically the non-power five 
schools sponsoring men’s basketball, 286 schools, excluding the 65 Power Five 
campuses (ACC, Big 10, Big-12, Pac-12, and SEC), to establish a definition of a 
Cinderella team during the March Madness tournament. This chapter summarizes the 
methodology, data, and sample used in this dissertation.   
I ran forty total generalized linear regressions to determine if an institution is in 
fact a Cinderella Story, then what changes did a university see to variables including 
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alumni giving/donations, SAT scores of incoming students, total number of applicants 
and enrolled students, and total percentage of admitted students the year after, and/or 
three years after. Additionally, I controlled for Director’s Cup points, which accounts for 
other sport success in male and female varsity sports on campus, as compared to other 
non-Power Five schools that did not make the tournament in the prior three years. This 
control variable was repeated for percentage of admitted students, total enrolled students, 
total applicants, and total giving. Therefore the comparison group for the 2012 
tournament is similar conference schools that did not make the tournament in 2011, 2010, 
or 2009, and only 2011 when analyzing immediate impact. Twenty of these regressions 
looked at all schools and the two definitions of Cinderella, making the tournament being 
the first, and winning a game in the tournament as the second definition. The other 
twenty generalized linear regressions excluded the BIG EAST Conference as a non-
Power Five conference since it has historically been one of the strongest men’s basketball 
conferences with resources similar to those of Power Five schools, and analyzed with the 
same two definitions of Cinderella.  
Research Question 
The literature has discussed institutional factors that may be affected by athletic 
success, however the literature has not studied these variables in conjunction with each 
other as they apply to the Cinderella stories of March Madness and those similar 
institutions without a tournament appearance, known as the comparison group. 
Additionally, this study looks at these variables in two different measures of time, 
immediately following a tournament appearance and three years later, which other studies 
have not yet done. The value of this study is its ability to show that institutions that make 
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the March Madness tournament may have greater success in their academic and 
institutional measures than similar schools without a tournament appearance. This study 
looks to determine what characteristics, if any, shared across non-Power Five institutions 
change because of sudden success and national attention during the NCAA Men’s 
Basketball Tournament. To address these characteristics, the following research question 
guides the data collected and methodology for analysis: 
1. Does winning at least one game in the March Madness Tournament or just 
solely making the 68-team tournament benefit colleges through increased and 
stronger applicants and greater financial donations relative to institutions that did 
not make the tournament?   
This research question will help determine whether there is a correlation between a non-
Power Five institution making the March Madness tournament, and a positive return on 
campus through more donations, an increase in SAT scores of accepted students, and an 
increase in number of applicants. The comparison group comprised of similar non-Power 
Five institutions without the athletic success during March Madness will help to 
determine just how beneficial being a Cinderella Story is to a school making the 68 team 
bracket. 
Restatement of Significance 
 This study is significant because it will provide information that is valuable to 
athletic administration, institutional campus leaders, including members of admissions, 
alumni relations, enrollment management, college and university presidents, and other 
key decision makers. This information will add to a constantly growing list of literature 
on the revenue generating potential surrounding high level collegiate men’s basketball, 
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mostly due to multiyear lucrative media and broadcast deals. This study is significant for 
athletic and school administration, as well as coaches to understand how valuable 
national television time is to one’s institution and one’s team. This study will also add to 
the preexisting literature on college choice, and how impactful successful men’s 
basketball teams can be for an institution’s recruitment of students.  
Research Design 
This quantitative research design included data from IPEDS, originally from 
2001-2015, and variables created that ultimately focused on tournament success from 
2003-2012. The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which making the 
Division I men’s basketball annual NCAA tournament has an influence on other campus 
factors, including SAT scores of accepted students, total donations, total number of 
applications received, percentage of students admitted, and total enrolled. The college 
application process does not sync harmoniously with the Division I men’s basketball 
season due to the fact that March Madness occurs as students are choosing among the 
colleges that have accepted them. College application deadlines typically range from 
January 1 through early February, with admissions decisions usually made in March and 
April, with an enrollment deposit due in early May. There are modifications however, for 
example, early decision runs from November 1 through November 15, and a number of 
colleges have rolling admissions policies that extend the traditional timeline 
(collegeboard.com). See Table 4 for the college choice and the March Madness 
correlation.  
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Table 4 College Choice and the March Madness Correlation  
College 
Basketball 
Preseason  Season 
 starts 
Begins 
Conferenc
e Schedule  
Conference 
Championship
s/ NCAA 
March 
Madness 
NCAA 
Championship into 
offseason  
Admission
s 
Campus 
visits/ 
interviews  
Early 
applicatio
n 
deadlines 
Regular 
applicatio
n 
deadlines 
Admissions 
decisions 
begin  
Admissions 
decisions/attendan
ce decision 
deadlines 
 Septembe
r - 
October 
Novembe
r 
December 
– January   
February – 
March  
April – May  
 
In order to better understand the metrics of this research question, Table 5 helps 
define the outcomes of making it to the NCAA Division I men’s basketball tournament 
and expected timeframes based on previous literature. Additionally, in this study 
examining if in fact these effects do exist either immediately or three years after a school 
makes a tournament appearance will be an important indicator of the impact over time 
making it to March Madness has on an institution.   
Table 5: Earliest Potential Outcomes and Estimated Timeframe  
Outcomes Estimated Timeframe  
Applications   1-2 years after (Toma & Cross, 1998; Pope & Pope, 2014) 
SAT scores 1-2 years after (Chung, 2012; Pope & Pope, 2008) 
Private 
giving  
Immediately (Tucker, 2004; Frank, 2004) 
 
Sample   
The sample for this dissertation was all NCAA Division I institutions that sponsor 
intercollegiate men’s basketball teams, excluding Power Five conferences. First, I 
selected the conferences in IPEDS that sponsored Division I men’s basketball, totaling 
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thirty-two conferences and 351 individual schools. Of the 351 Division I men’s 
basketball teams remaining, 65 were in the Power Five Conferences (ACC, BIG 10, BIG 
12, Pac-12, and SEC), leaving a population of 286 schools in 27 other conferences that 
play Division I men’s basketball currently. For the complete list of institutions, please see 
Table A in the appendix.  
Since this study is conducted across ten years and there has been a lot of 
conference and divisional movement, conference realignment has been a large part of the 
NCAA Division I structure. For the purpose of this study, between 2001-2015 there were 
348 schools with Division I athletic programs to start but with schools moving down a 
division, up a division, or out of collegiate athletics altogether, the Division I landscape 
grew to 351 schools.  It is imperative to understand that once an NCAA affiliated 
institution changes its membership status, moving from Division II to Division I for 
example, there is a four-year phasing period that prevents a school from competing in 
post season play, including conference post-season and March Madness until year five 
when the school is a full NCAA Division I member (NCAA, 2014c).  
 Table 6 shows the Cinderella teams that have made the tournament each year of 
this study and the Cinderella teams that have won a first round game and shows the 
number of BIG EAST teams from years 2003-2012. It is important to note the BIG EAST 
saw significant movement of schools exiting the conference over the years, which is why 
the schools included each year vary. Additionally, as mentioned previously, over the 
years, as the bracket expanded to 68 teams, there has been games added, known most 
recently as the First Four. For the purpose of this sample, I have decided to not count the 
First Four victory for a school as a win, and that a win in the tournament means after the 
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First Four games are played. The First Four involves eight teams, with the four lowest-
seeded teams competing for two 16 seeds and a chance to face the number one seeds in 
two regions. Additionally, the other four teams in the First Four games are the last four 
at-large teams (NCAA, 2017c).  
Table 6 Annual Number of Cinderella Teams Including BIG EAST 
Year Number of 
Cinderella 
Teams  
Number of 
Cinderella 
Teams  
with First 
Round Wins 
Number of 
BIG EAST 
Cinderella 
Teams  
Number of 
BIG EAST 
Cinderella 
Teams with 
First Round 
Wins 
2012 45 16 9 6 
2011 43 16 11 7 
2010 41 15 8 4 
2009 36 14 7 6 
2008 39 15 6 6 
2007 37 11 6 3 
2006 41 15 8 5 
2005 40 15 6 4 
2004 43 15 6 5 
2003 38 12 4 4 
 
Treatment Group 
The treatment group for this study is the non-Power Five schools that are a 
Cinderella team in one or more NCAA Division I March Madness tournaments from 
2003-2012. The full list of schools each year can be found in Appendix Table A, and 
schools are from the following conferences: Western Athletic Conference, West Coast 
Conference, the Summit League, the Ivy League, Sun Belt Conference, Southwestern 
Athletic Conference, Southland Conference, Southern Conference, Patriot League, Ohio 
Valley Conference, Northeast Conference, Mountain West Conference, Missouri Valley 
Conference, Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference, Mid-American Conference, Metro 
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Atlantic Athletic Conference, Horizon League, Conference USA, Colonial Athletic 
Association, Big West Conference, Big South Conference, Big Sky Conference, BIG 
EAST Conference, Atlantic 10 Conference, American Athletic Conference, America East 
Conference, and Atlantic Sun Conference. Tourney variables exist for years 2001-2015 to 
account for the comparison variable, which looks at the tournament appearances within a 
three-year window, beginning in 2003.  
Comparison Group  
While the focus of this study is on understanding what, if any, changes occur to 
Cinderella schools, a comparison group is necessary to draw any conclusions about what 
a Cinderella run for a school actually means. It is important to compare these trends in 
order to demonstrate causality. These schools will come from the same conferences as the 
Cinderella schools. In order to create this group, first I identified the schools that did not 
make the tournament in the last three years. The significance of measuring three years 
prior to a school’s tournament appearance is it isolates the effect of making the 
tournament by removing any schools that have made the tournament recently. So for 
example, beginning with the 2004 March Madness Tournament I created a dummy 
variable for tournament appearance in 2001, 2002, and 2003. If a school was not in any 
of the three, they were added to the comparison group. I then repeated this for years 
2005-2012.  
Variables  
Dependent Variables  
Dependent variables (Table 7) were selected due to the wide use as measures for 
educational quality, student success, alumni relations, and prestige. In order to further 
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determine the impact of an institution making it to the NCAA tournament the following 
variables from IPEDS listed below for each year 2003-2012.  
Applications – This variable measured the number of applicants for the year prior to an 
institution making its tournament appearance, and then both one and three years post 
making the appearance. This timeframe allows for a better picture of the institution’s 
applicant pool to be understood, and allows for changes to develop over time, or seen 
immediately. The significance of the prior year is that it helps with showing that schools 
that make the tournament are more successful in academic measures than schools that do 
not. This is especially important with the variables associated with admissions due to the 
college timelines in Table 4 and Table 5. This variable was represented in a percent 
change in applications received.  
Admitted Students – this variable measured the number of accepted students for the 
year prior to a school’s tournament appearance, and then both one and three years post 
making the tournament. This variable is logged, which can be interpreted as a percentage 
change.  
Enrolled Students – another admissions factor used in this study is total enrolled 
students. This variable measures the incoming class size at an institution before a 
tournament appearance and three years after, indicating if there is any percent change due 
to a Cinderella appearance. 
Gifts - The gifts variable is used to determine if fundraising at an institution is influenced 
because of a team’s tournament run. While this variable does not distinguish where 
exactly the money would be allocated to (athletics, facility improvements, faculty 
salaries), ultimately it is an indicator of a growing interest in a team or school because of 
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the national athletic attention. This logged variable is measured before a team’s 
tournament appearance, and then both one and three years after, and was converted into 
an adjusted gifts variable using the Consumer Price Index to adjust for inflation each year 
included within this study.  
ACT/SAT Average Scores – these continuous variables were converted into a single 
measurement determined by the percentage of students at that institution taking either 
SAT or the ACT exam. This variable was gathered by using each year of data separately 
for “Admission and test scores” and “SAT Critical Reading 25th percentile score, SAT 
Critical Reading 75th percentile score, SAT Math 25th percentile score, SAT Math 75 
percentile score, ACT Composite 25th percentile score, ACT Composite 75th percentile 
score, Percent of first-time degree/certificate seeking students submitting ACT scores, 
and Percent of first-time degree/certificate seeking students submitting SAT scores”. This 
data was gathered for all institutions in the sample, for all years 2001-2015. I combined 
the 25th and 75th related scores for SAT reading and SAT math to create an SAT average 
score, and took the ACT composite for each year, and used the percent taking ACT/SAT 
to determine which was the dominant test for that institution.  A concordance table was 
used to convert ACT scores into SAT scores to create the new variable 
(Collegebaord.org). Measuring the average scores for the year prior to a school making 
the tournament and then both one and three years following a tournament appearance 
shows any statistical significance.  
Table 7 Dependent Variables  
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Dependent Variables  IPEDS: 
• SAT scores  
• Applications received 
• Admitted students 
• Enrolled students   
• Gifts, including 
contributions from 
affiliated organizations 
Control Variables 
Due to the fact that this study is interested in any changes to an institution over 
time, specifically immediately and also three years later, I created control variables for 
my dependent variables to account for the previous year success. Therefore, prior to 
running my generalized linear regressions, control variables to account for the previous 
year were created for admitted, enrolled, SAT, gifts, applications, and Directors Cup 
variables. This process was repeated for the years of the study, 2003-2012, and for the 
other dependent variables. It is important to note that I am using some variables as both 
outcome and control variables, to control for trends in the prior year, just in case 
institutions that made the March Madness tournament had different tendencies prior to 
making March Madness. Additionally log variables were created for both the control 
variables and the outcome variables again for gifts, applications, enrolled, admitted, and 
Directors Cup variables.  
The Directors Cup control variable played an important role in this study because 
it prevents a school’s athletic success other than men’s basketball from impacting 
findings. Using Learfield Directors’ Cup rankings, the NCAA program that awards a pre-
determined number of points for an institution’s athletic success in the NCAA 
tournaments for men’s and women’s championships and then ranks these schools 
annually, I was able to capture if a Cinderella team has had athletic success outside of 
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basketball, and if that in turn could influence the findings. The Directors’ Cup 
calculations for Division I sports began in 1993-1994 and points are assigned based on 
success within a particular sport (NACDA). For Division I, scoring must include men’s 
basketball, baseball, women’s basketball and women’s volleyball, and then the next 
highest eleven sports for that institution, regardless of the gender of the sport (NACDA). 
For the purpose of this study, I created a Directors’ Cup variable for each institution in 
the sample as well as the comparison group using the Directors’ Cup ranking. Since the 
Directors Cup rankings varied annually, to account for zero or any missing Directors Cup 
ranking I had to write a code for missing or zero variables to be converted into below the 
lowest total points given to a school. So for example, in 2004 there were 274 schools 
ranked in the Director’s Cup, so any school in my sample that did not having a ranking or 
had a zero, I changed their ranking to 275, essentially the worst ranking for that year.   
Design Analysis  
 This study utilized generalized linear regressions to describe financial and 
admissions factors over time. Nelder and Wedderburn originally introduced generalized 
linear regressions in 1972 as an extension to more familiar linear regression models.  
Since my study is including multiple factors across multiple years of data, from 2003-
2012, this analysis works well as it models complex repeated measures. Generalized 
linear regressions allow for any patterns of interactions or associations to develop, which 
is important in this study since it analyzes the same variables and the same controls but 
with a different sample across multiple years.  
 Since the sample in this study is either Cinderella schools or not, generalized 
linear regressions are appropriate to run. For the purpose of my study, generalized refers 
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to the dependence on potentially more than one explanatory variable, while maintaining 
linear parameters and assuming that any errors are independent. Log functions were used 
for outcome and control variables. The log function is necessary in generalized linear 
regressions to transform a count variable into a continuous variable (Hopkins, 2010). Log 
variables were created to measure total outcomes because failure to include the log for a 
variable like total applications significantly overweighs larger schools as compared to 
smaller schools. The methodology of using generalized linear regressions allowed this 
study to account for varying teams qualifying annually for the tournament with mixed 
results while using repeated measures.  
 The college choice process played a role in the design of this study, as previously 
mentioned in this chapter, especially since basketball season success is important in 
determining any lags athletic success has on an institution immediately but also the years 
following. The influence March Madness has on applications an institution receives 
would impact the immediate fall applications process, but also given the timing of the 
conclusion of the tournament and the national audience, the impact also could lag 
multiple years after the tournament appearance, which is why this study designed 
variables that account for a one year and three year lag post tournament appearance.   
Limitations  
 Potential limitations of this study include the fact that the nature of the Cinderella 
Story is relatively subjective because there is no one clear and consistent definition of a 
Cinderella team throughout the years of the NCAA Tournament. For the purpose of this 
analysis, I have defined Cinderella two ways to better understand how impactful a March 
Madness appearance is for a non-Power Five institution, and what, if any, changes to 
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campus admissions, giving, and accepted students occur due to the sudden national 
interest and national attention the tournament provides. Even though two definitions 
provide a wide scope into high-level athletic success and its impact on a campus 
community, some may argue that the Cinderella definition should have a tournament 
seeding or overall record associated to further illustrate the fact that an institution was not 
expected to make the tournament or win a game in the tournament.  
 Another limitation to this study is the fact that this examines only Division I 
institutions with men’s basketball teams. Therefore this study may not be generalizable 
across Division II or Division III schools mainly because of the media coverage the 
Division I tournament gets. With every game being broadcasted nationally and available 
on tablets and cell phones, coverage is everywhere and available for everyone. The same 
cannot be said of the DII and DIII tournament coverage.  
 While the most powerful and financially lucrative institutions are removed from 
this study, the Power Five conference, this study does not show just how large the gap in 
national attention or the financial differences between Power Five schools with big 
football programs and DI men’s basketball teams. By not including these conferences, 
this study provides only a glimpse of the impact March Madness has on non-Power Five 
schools, not across Division I in totality.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 An analysis of the descriptive statistics for the most recent year included in this 
study, 2012, are provided in Table 8:  
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics 2012 Unlogged Totals  
 Applications Admissions Enrollment Gifts SAT 
      
Mean 14780 7835 2504 60,379,382 1140 
Standard 
Deviation 
11327 5582 1754 156,083,972 178 
N=309 
Table 8 shows the mean SAT score for 2012 as 1140, with a standard deviation of 178. 
This was just better than the average SAT score for 2012, which was 1010 out of 1600 
(College Board.org). The average first time student enrollment of non-Power Five 
schools in 2012 was 2504, with a standard deviation of 1754. Applications on average for 
this specific year were 14780 with an 11327 standard deviation. Lastly, gifts on average 
had an extremely high standard deviation, partly due to every institution having an 
individualized fundraising approach with results greatly varying.  
Conclusion  
This chapter provides an overview of my methodology used in this study, 
including the population and sample, as well as the quantitative approach. In this chapter 
the variables were identified, explained where the preliminary data came from, and 
illustrated the procedures required to carry out this study. Lastly, this section clarified 
how the research question is to be evaluated. The results of the methods described will be 
discussed in Chapter IV.  
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Chapter IV 
RESULTS 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapters, the research question focuses on the 
financial and admissions factors as they relate to a non-Power Five school making an 
appearance as a Cinderella team in the NCAA March Madness tournament. The results of 
this study are presented in this chapter to show the changes an institution experiences 
looking specifically at the immediate results and three years after a tournament 
appearance. Additionally, a comparison group of similar schools that did not make the 
tournament in the prior year provides a better understanding of the impact making the 
tournament can have on a school versus those who do not make it. The objective of this 
quantitative study was to find out what, if any, institutional and financial factors are 
impacted by an institution’s March Madness Cinderella run, using two definitions of 
Cinderella, and analyzing the results specifically both one and three years later.  
Given the nature of this study, generalized linear regressions were used to analyze 
multiple factors over the years 2003-2012. The control variables in my study included 
Directors Cup, to account for any other athletic success on a campus, as well as 
controlling for the previous year for each dependent variable including applications, 
admissions, enrollment, gifts, and SAT. The results were presented to show the 
differences between generalized linear regressions including the BIG EAST institutions 
and generalized linear regressions without the BIG EAST schools.  
The results for all non-Power Five schools did not change significantly when the 
BIG EAST conference schools were excluded. The generalized linear regressions were 
run both ways because the BIG EAST has been one of the best conferences annually for 
Division I men’s basketball, and I did not want this conference’s presence to skew the 
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results in any way. The results from the models without the BIG EAST for both one and 
three years post tournament appearance are all available in the Appendix as the results are 
not really different. The following results are shown with all non-Power Five institutions 
with the Cinderella outcome variable and the win a game outcome variable to distinguish 
between the potential impact just making the tournament or winning a game in the 
tournament has on an institution’s financial and/or admissions factors.  
Regression Results 
The research question guiding my study was: Does winning at least one game in 
the March Madness Tournament or just solely making the 68-team tournament benefit 
institutions through increased and stronger applicants, and greater financial donations 
relative to institutions that did not make the tournament? To answer this question, the 
dependent variables were analyzed while controlling for a number of variables. The first 
dependent variable analyzed was applications including all non-Power Five schools in 
Table 8, and then without BIG EAST schools (see Appendix). This organization was then 
repeated for each dependent variable in relation to the two outcomes, Cinderella or win a 
game.  
After running the generalized linear regressions for the Cinderella outcomes 
looking three years after a team’s tournament appearance, I ran the same generalized 
linear regressions but for the immediate year after a team’s tournament appearance. The 
immediate results for the Cinderella and win a game variables are displayed in tables 
immediately following the three year tables. I decided to run both for a number of 
reasons. Since I use admissions factors in my study, the application timeline is important. 
Based on previous literature, I had believed major changes would have been seen soon 
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after a tournament appearance. Additionally, I was interested to understand how 
frequently and lucrative immediate tournament appearances translated into donations. 
Again, this variable one-year later and three years later was of interest.  
Table 9 with All Non-Power Five Schools Looking at the Three-Year Lagged Outcome: 
Applications 
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  -.035 .0159 *    
Win a Game    -.004 .0243  
CONTROLS 
(prior year) 
      
Applications .970 .0147 *** .970 .0147 *** 
Percent Admitted  .229 .0363 *** .226 .0364 *** 
Enrolled -.011 .0139  -.010 .0139  
Gifts .027 .0036 *** .027 .0036 *** 
SAT .000 4.1643E-5 ** .000 4.1668E-
5 
** 
Director’s Cup .019 .0157  .032 .0156 * 
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
The results indicate that Cinderella teams see a significant (p<.05) decrease in 
number of applications received, down 3.5% three years after a tournament appearance, 
relative to teams that have not made the tournament in the previous three years. 
Additionally, the win a game outcome is nowhere near significant but also sees a .4% 
decrease in number of applications received. These results are different from what I 
expected since previous research with regards to athletic success and college applications 
has shown an increase in number of applications received. This finding is actually 
showing that three years after a tournament appearance applications decrease, and even 
immediately following the number of applications also decrease.  
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Table 9.1 with All Non-Power Five Schools Looking at the One-Year Lagged Outcome: 
Applications 
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  -.009 .0127     
Win a Game    .028 .0193  
CONTROLS 
(prior year) 
      
Applications .923 .0099 *** .924 .0099 *** 
Percent Admitted  .038 .0119 *** .037 .0119 ** 
Enrolled .001 .0104  .002 .0104  
Gifts .016 .0028 *** .016 .0028 *** 
SAT 6.082E-5 3.3326E-5  6.048E-5 3.3302E-
5 
 
Director’s Cup .015 .0125  .026 .0124  
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 The next results look at the percentage of admitted students in relation to the two 
Cinderella definitions and the various controls.  
Table 10 with All Non-Power Five Schools Looking at the Three-Year Lagged Outcome: 
Percent Admitted 
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  .016 .0069 *    
Win a Game    .007 .0106  
CONTROLS  
(prior year) 
      
Applications -.028 .0064 *** -.028 .0064 *** 
Percent Admitted .775 .0159 *** .776 .0159 *** 
Enrolled .028 .0061 *** .028 .0061 *** 
Gifts -.006 .0016 *** -.006 .0016 *** 
SAT -7.227E-
5 
1.8227E-5 *** -7.091E-5 1.8238E-
5 
*** 
Director’s Cup .011 .0069  .006 .0068  
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
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Looking at the results for the generalized linear regression for the percent 
admitted and teams making the tournament, institutions that made the tournament as a 
Cinderella saw a significant (p<0.05) change in the percent of admitted students. The rate 
of admittance increased 1.6%, indicating three years after a tournament appearance an 
institution is not as selective. This is a surprising result as I had expected to see an 
increase in institutional selectivity due to the high volume of applications and overall 
interest in the institution following a March Madness appearance (Pope & Pope, 2009; 
Toma & Cross, 1996). Winning a game is not statistically significant when looking at the 
percent admitted outcome, and only sees a slight .7% increase.    
Table 10.1 with All Non-Power Five Schools Looking at the One-Year Lagged Outcome: 
Percent Admitted 
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  .003 .0127     
Win a Game    .016 .0194  
CONTROLS  
(prior year) 
      
Applications -.018 .0099  -.018 .0099  
Percent Admitted .983 .0119 *** .983 .0119 *** 
Enrolled .008 .0105  .008 .0105  
Gifts .009 .0028 ** .009 .0028 ** 
SAT -5.943E-
5 
3.3491E-5  -5.893E-5 3.3472E-
5 
 
Director’s Cup .017 .0126  .019 .0125  
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 
Another generalized regression focused on the outcome of SAT scores, shown in 
Table 11 for all non-Power Five Schools and in the Appendix for the table excluding the 
BIG EAST. The results of making the tournament and winning a game in the March 
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Madness tournament while and the outcome of interest, SAT, both do not show 
statistically significant outcomes. Again, this is not surprising when considering the 
results of the other admission factors, such as percent admitted, which suggested that 
although they admitted a higher percentage of applicants, test scores of the admitted 
students did not change. Since the percent admitted variable increased by1.6% for 
Cinderella teams, clearly the institutions either did not want to be, or did not need to be 
selective three years after a tournament appearance. Another aspect to consider is that an 
institution is unable to be as selective due to their enrollment targets. The average 
Cinderella team saw a 2.79 SAT score increase and teams that won a game in the 
tournament also saw a 1.83 point increase.  
Table 11 with All Non-Power Five Schools Looking at the Three-Year Lagged Outcome: 
SAT 
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  2.793 4.9252     
Win a Game    1.835 7.5426  
CONTROLS 
(prior year) 
      
Applications 9.968 4.5668 * 9.937 4.5674 * 
Admissions -22.555 11.2594 * -22.452 11.2649 * 
Enrolled -8.964 4.3233 * -8.985 4.3243 * 
Gifts 10.145 1.0941 *** 10.137 1.0955 *** 
SAT .806 .0128 *** .806 .0128 *** 
Director’s Cup 4.720 4.8631  4.075 4.8325  
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
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Table 11.1 with All Non-Power Five Schools Looking at the One-Year Lagged Outcome: 
SAT 
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  2.846 4.9240     
Win a Game    2.061 7.5434  
CONTROLS 
(prior year) 
      
Applications 20.876 3.8278 *** 20.804 3.8267 *** 
Admissions -10.559 4.5953 * -10.531 4.5992 * 
Enrolled -9.028 4.0652 * -9.039 4.0664 * 
Gifts 9.997 1.0946 *** 9.988 1.0962 *** 
SAT .804 .0129 *** .804 .0129 *** 
Director’s Cup 4.577 4.8567  3.968 4.8263  
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 
Staying on the discussion of institutional admissions factors and the impact March 
Madness Cinderella teams have, the enrollment variable, which is the number of new 
students, does not indicate much of any change when related to a team that makes the 
tournament and/or schools that win a game in the tournament. Findings for all non-Power 
Five schools are shared in Table 12, and then in the Appendix for all schools excluding 
the BIG EAST.  
Table 12 with All Non-Power Five Schools Looking at the Three-Year Lagged Outcome: 
Enrolled 
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  -.009 .0105     
Win a Game    -.010 .0161  
CONTROLS 
(prior year) 
      
Applications .029 .0098 ** .029 .0098  
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Percent Admitted  .118 .0241 *** .118 .0241 *** 
Enrolled .975 .0092 *** .975 .0092 *** 
Gifts .007 .0024 ** .007 .0024 ** 
SAT 4.014E-6 2.7662E-5  3.177E-6 2.7653E-
5 
 
Director’s Cup .019 .0104  .021 .0103  
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 The effects of being a Cinderella school and/or winning a game in the tournament 
and enrollment results in no statistically significant findings for either the Cinderella or 
the win a game outcome. The results show that the enrollment of the freshmen class is 
not changing for a non-Power Five March Madness tournament team three years after 
their tournament Cinderella or win a game results. The selectivity of the incoming class is 
also not significant, as previously mentioned in the percent-admitted regression results, 
signifying the class size is slightly smaller three years after a tournament appearance but 
not because of being more selective. Both the Cinderella teams and teams who win a 
game see a slight .9% and 1% decrease in enrolled students three years later. This asks 
the question, are the marketing dollars an institution spends to sell athletic success to 
incoming classes inefficient with their target market? Do students not resonate with that 
current success because they are not currently enrolled in a particular institution and if an 
individual is not a sports fan, is there enough of other substantial materials and 
experiences a school is selling to overcome the athletics emphasis?  
Table 12.1 with All Non-Power Five Schools Looking at the One-Year Lagged Outcome: 
Enrolled 
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  .001 .0093     
Win a Game    .007 .0142  
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CONTROLS 
(prior year) 
      
Applications -.006 .0073  -.006 .0021 ** 
Percent Admitted  .030 .0087 *** .030 .0087 *** 
Enrolled .965 .0077 *** .965 .0077 *** 
Gifts .006 .0021 ** .006 .0021 ** 
SAT -2.734E-
5 
2.4518E-5  -2.716E-5 2.4507E-
5 
 
Director’s Cup .017 .0092  .018 .0091 * 
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
Higher education institutions are constantly looking for ways to build 
relationships with alumni and grow the number of donors to assist with the needed 
financial support to operate an institution, including the expensive athletics department. 
Looking at total gifts, not just specific to the athletic department, was key in this study 
since departments use this funding for everything including facility upgrades, coaches 
bonuses, or student aide. Therefore, if a team makes a post-season tournament, the hope 
that more gifts and greater amounts of donors will be generated was very important to 
test in this study. When controlling for gifts as shown in the results in Table 13 below for 
all schools and in the appendix with the BIG EAST excluded, neither the Cinderella 
outcome or teams who win a game see a significant change in gifts. Interestingly, while 
not significant, Cinderella teams see a 4% decrease in total amounts of gifts received 
three years after a team’s tournament appearance, and similarly teams who win a game in 
the tournament also see a 1.9% decrease.  
Table 13 with All Non-Power Five Schools Looking at the Three-Year Lagged 
Outcome: Gifts 
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  -.040 .0381     
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Win a Game    -.019 .0584  
CONTROLS 
(prior year) 
      
Applications .004 .0354  .041 .0354  
Percent Admitted -.046 .0873  -.048 .0874  
Enrolled .061 .0334  .061 .0334  
Gifts .912 .0088 *** .912 .0088 *** 
SAT .001 .0001 *** .001 .0001 *** 
Director’s Cup -.069 .0377  -.058 .0375  
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 
Table 13.1 with All Non-Power Five Schools Looking at the One-Year Lagged 
Outcome: Gifts 
 
 
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 
 
Summary 
 
The purpose of this study was to try to determine what institutional financial and 
admissions factors are impacted by a non-Power Five institution’s March Madness 
tournament appearance and/or win in the tournament. The outcomes for Cinderella and 
the Win a Game variable were not significant when controlling for any of the dependent 
variables. In fact, no findings were statistically significant when measuring March 
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  -.007 .0392     
Win a Game    .042 .0600  
CONTROLS 
(prior year) 
      
Applications .043 .0306  .044 .0306  
Percent Admitted -.051 .0368  -.052 .0368  
Enrolled .116 .0323 *** .117 .0324 *** 
Gifts .890 .0091 *** .890 .0091 *** 
SAT .001 .0001 *** .001 .0001 *** 
Director’s Cup -.055 .0388  -.042 .0385  
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Madness success for a team immediately following their tournament appearance and/or a 
win in the tournament, as well as three years later, which lends itself to asking then why 
does every team work so hard to get in and why do schools invest so much into collegiate 
athletics?  
This chapter attempted to answer the research question that guided this study. The 
results presented in this chapter provided a statistical analysis of the factors that changed 
both immediately and/or three years after a non-Power Five institution’s men’s basketball 
team making the March Madness tournament and/or winning a game in it. The results 
proved that not all institutional financial or admission factors are significantly impacted, 
but that some are three years later (see Table 14), and some are one year later (Table 
14.1), but not to the extent that justifies significant advantages to non-Power Five schools 
that make the March Madness tournament over those who do not. It is important to note 
that the results also illustrated that the Cinderella and Win a Game variables were rarely 
significant in the regressions, and while the Cinderella variables were typically negative, 
the win a game coefficients were generally more uniformly positive. This suggests that 
immediately after and three years after an institution’s tournament appearance, the March 
Madness results for that school have already been forgotten. Chapter V concludes these 
findings while providing implications of the study and suggestions for future research. 
Table 14 Significant Findings for both Cinderella Definitions Three Years Later 
Cinderella 
Definitions  
Controls 
 Applications Percent 
Admitted 
Enrolled Gifts SAT 
Making the 
Tournament  
- *  + *     
Win a Game      
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Table 13.1 Significant Findings for both Cinderella Definitions One Year Later 
Cinderella 
Definitions  
Controls 
 Applications Percent 
Admitted 
Enrolled Gifts SAT 
Making the 
Tournament  
- * + *    
Win a Game      
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The purpose of this study was to examine what, if any, institutional financial and 
admissions factors change as a result of a non-Power Five school making the NCAA 
Division I men’s basketball tournament, and/or winning a game in the tournament. This 
was not the first study to look at the impact March Madness has on a campus, but it does 
broaden the definition of a Cinderella team by not analyzing the seed of an institution, but 
rather what conference a team is associated with while also arguing that just making it to 
the tournament constitutes being a Cinderella when from a non-Power Five conference. 
This study is even more original in the design as it is shaped to determine the role 
athletics have on college choice and the overall impact the March Madness tournament 
has on number of applicants, SAT test scores of those students accepted, and the total 
percentage of students admitted and total enrolled students. Studies have looked at the 
significance of March Madness but not the impact when controlling for previous years 
success or Director’s Cup rankings, and I think this is key because any positive changes 
could be a correlation to those things, not the exact March Madness Cinderella run. 
Lastly, most studies analyzing college athletic success and the impact on campus focus 
on the immediate results. Conversely, this study focuses both on the immediate results 
and on the results three years after a school’s tournament appearance or win, to allow for 
a more realistic picture of the long term impact making the tournament and/or winning a 
game in the tournament has on a non-Power Five campus.  
Summary of Results  
 This study sample included the 286 Division I schools in 27 non-Power Five 
conferences that sponsor men’s basketball. Specifically, from the years 2003-2012, all 
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non-Power Five schools were categorized by one of the two Cinderella definitions, or in 
the comparison group with other similar institutions that did not make the 68 team 
tournament for the previous year. The key finding from this study is that institutional 
financial and admission factors are impacted by an institution making the tournament 
and/or winning a game, yet when these findings are measured three years after the 
tournament appearance both definitions of a Cinderella team is not significant regardless 
of what controls are being used. The only statistical findings three years out was if a team 
is a Cinderella then there is a significant decrease in the number of applications to the 
school and the percent of students admitted is also significant positive. I had expected 
significant results in this study, especially looking at the immediate year after a team’s 
tournament appearance for measures like gifts, but this was not the case as the analysis 
proved. As a result of the literature on college choice and the timing of the admissions 
process (Pope & Pope, 2009; Bremmer & Kesselring, 1993; McEvoy, 2006; and Mixon 
& Trevino, 2005), I would have thought that overall any changes to institutional financial 
and admissions factors would still be felt three years after a March Madness appearance 
and/or tournament win. In fact, my findings actually showed the opposite, that a 
Cinderella team, regardless of which definition is used, does not experience any 
significant changes three years later, and in some cases change was in the opposite 
direction than expected. Additionally, the same results were true when looking at the 
impact of a team’s tournament appearance or game won the immediate following year.  
Implications of the Study 
 My intent for this study was to determine if in fact being one of the 68 institutions 
that makes it to the annual March Madness tournament actually affects a school 
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positively in both financial and admissions ways. My study has significance because 
NCAA Division I athletics, and in particular the men’s basketball March Madness 
tournament, is a multi-billion dollar industry that increases annually in both audience 
reach and total revenue. As fans continue to consume every opportunity to watch, attend, 
and cheer for their 68 team bracket each year, the resources that schools invest in 
garnering competitive men’s basketball teams at these non-Power Five conference 
schools also continues to grow. In order for university presidents, athletic directors, and 
other stakeholders to make informed spending decisions, this study helps to show the 
impact a March Madness Cinderella experience has on a school.  
My study’s results have found that there are significant relationships between 
some outcomes when analyzing the two definitions of Cinderella, specifically with 
applications and percent admitted both one year and three years later. Therefore 
regardless of the definition, Cinderella teams saw a significant change in applications and 
percent admitted, but not necessarily in the direction they neither expected nor wanted. 
Cinderella teams saw a significant (p<.05) decrease in number of applications received, 
down 3.5% three years after a tournament appearance, and while percent admitted 
increased 1.6% three years after a tournament appearance, this further proved an 
institution is not as selective even after a higher number of applications and overall 
interest in the institution following a March Madness appearance.  
 The measures of academic success that could be influenced by athletic success 
have evolved over the years, and some measures have not yet been studied over time. For 
example, the evolution of media megaphone platforms like Twitter and Facebook provide 
an institution so much more national attention and recognition for athletic success than 
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ever before. These social media platforms provide fresh content and create a network of 
fans, intrigued followers, and even potential students. As the prominence of these 
platforms continues to grow, institutions will rely even more on them as carriers of brand 
storytelling. While an institution today might measure the effectiveness of mailings and 
events in terms of a data point like acceptance rate, institutions in the future will utilize 
social media measurement tools to assess the impact of its posts. Measuring this social 
impact has not become something studied across the non-Power Five landscape 
potentially due to resources and size of school, but non-Power Five social media accounts 
still provide brief snapshots of just how valuable, how marketable, and in turn how 
profitable one’s athletic success on the national stage and shared via social media really is 
for an institution. Maybe this is the major question this study raises, that when controlling 
for the previous years success, social media and multimedia focuses should help garner 
an increase in these outcomes. For example, greater media and social media attention and 
exposure should result in more applications and gifts. Institutions have never before seen 
a time with such developed and ubiquitous online media platforms, and colleges have yet 
to streamline measurements of Twitter mentions and other social media interactions with 
the school’s brand through the men’s basketball national platform.  
For the purpose of this study I focused on institutional and financial factors that 
could potentially change due to a school’s Cinderella story in March. However, it would 
be interesting to study other measurable factors, such as increases in website and social 
media traffic, to better analyze the impact being a Cinderella team has on the younger and 
tech-connected audiences. With recent tournament Cinderella teams, multimedia 
coverage has played even more of a role engaging the national audience with both the 
! 98 
team, but the university and campus community as a whole. Two examples come to mind 
in this year’s 2018 tournament, the 98 year old team nun, Sister Jean from Loyola-
Chicago, and Zach Seidel, the man behind the popular UMBC Athletics Twitter account 
that went viral during the team’s upset over the number one seeded Virginia by making 
humorous and sometimes snarky remarks to both basketball personalities and regular 
social media users. It would also be interesting to measure and connect social media, web 
traffic and other tech-connected interactions with things like bookstore sales, transfer 
student applications, admissions, marketing, and athletic spending.  
The benefits for a non-Power Five institution making it to the tournament and/or 
winning a game vary by institution, and with so many stakeholders involved, it is 
necessary for decision makers to understand the significant measurable changes to 
institutional financial and admissions factors because of a team’s Cinderella run may not 
actually exist. Therefore this leads to asking the question, does it make sense to continue 
to invest millions of dollars into basketball programs, coaches, and facilities? The 
statistical results in this study may not clearly endorse this, but for the numerous other 
reasons discussed throughout this study, including the spirit athletics provide, the media 
coverage and storylines about the university shared through sports, athletics should 
continue to be supported by the campus and key decision makers of the colleges.  
The multi-billion dollar industry of Division I college athletics make the March 
Madness tournament even more significant because of the potential additional revenue 
streams teams are able to establish with a Cinderella appearance and/or winning a game. 
However, it also costs a lot of money to compete at the highest level, hire the best 
coaches, and provide the facilities and staff necessary to help the student-athletes 
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compete at the highest level. Because of this, the idea of student fees is a real one, and a 
real concern for many (Lapan, 2016; Craig, 2016; & Jones & Rudolph, 2016). Again, not 
every college student is an athletics fan, yet if part of their tuition is immediately spoken 
for to benefit athletics, then he/she has every right to ask why the same fee is not being 
administered to enhance the arts program, or create better science facilities. Institutions 
have a right to charge fees as they deem necessary, but prospective students may also 
exercise their right and choose to study elsewhere knowing their tuition dollars are 
benefiting a small population that will not necessary every personally impact them.  
A campuses athletic performance can be an indicator of what a school values. 
Administrators and faculty can use this study to better understand that athletics played on 
a national stage like March Madness has an enormous reach and if structured well, the 
stage can be used to highlight the university’s administrative quality, financial strength, 
and overall academic prestige. Athletics may be the avenue to get people talking about 
the school, the facilities, the faculty, and more, when a national audience would not 
otherwise be connected to. Maybe the insignificance of the data proves schools are not 
doing enough to capitalize on their short-lived national attention and time in the spotlight. 
Additionally, maybe the insignificant findings suggest that institutional marketing dollars 
spent to sell athletic success to incoming classes is actually a turnoff to some, and if 
students do not resonate with that current athletic success because they are not currently 
enrolled in a particular institution or are not a sports fan, are there enough other 
experiences and offerings to fill the athletics void.  
March Madness provides an annual opportunity to craft a meticulous recruiting 
message to a select student population, and as institutions continue to face more 
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competition to attract full tuition paying students and keep increasing costs at bay. The 
March Madness Tournament casts a wide net over the nation, largely due to the fact that 
no other tournament like this exists for any sport, at any level. A casual fan that follows 
college basketball only in March is just as valued as the fifteen-year-old season ticket 
holder, and because of this, marketers have a unique opportunity to sell the spirit and 
community message to the masses. Whether or not this is done well by these schools, or 
if it actually leads to more applications or stronger incoming students is left to be seen.  
Suggestions for Future Research  
College athletics has morphed into a dangerous arms race with each institution 
vying to pay top dollar for the best coaches and administrators, build the greatest 
facilities, and attract the best athletes (Hoffer, Humphreys, Lacombe & Ruseski, 2014). 
Through flashier items like a bowling alley on campus and private sport specific dorm 
accommodations, schools lose sight about what is most important, the academic 
programs and education a student-athlete receives while competing in amateur athletics. 
Examples of these lavish digs popping up at universities throughout the country include 
most recently the 2017 National Champions Clemson’s football-only facility, roughly 
costing $55 million and opening strategically on National Signing Day, February 1, 2017. 
The facility included beach volleyball and basketball courts, miniature golf, an indoor 
slide, laser tag, a nap room, a bowling alley, and barber shop, all items that do not 
correlate with better academic or athletic performances (Kalland, 2015). Future research 
that analyzes spending habits of an institution after a Cinderella appearance, in particular 
the facility improvements made at a non-Power Five school.  
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My study focused on the analysis of the March Madness tournament as a whole, 
but it would be interesting to analyze the data from a geographical standpoint. Since the 
selection process for at-large bids in particular has potential geographical biases that can 
directly influence the future of a program, good and bad, it would be interesting to 
analyze how different parts of the country make out in the process. The literature 
regarding the at-large selection process is significantly underdeveloped and there is a 
need to study this more due to the financial implications for an institution to just get 
selected as one of the tournament teams. It would be interesting to analyze the 
performances of non Power Five schools in the four regions of the tournament bracket 
and how many miles they have to travel from their campus to compete as compared to the 
members of the Power Five conferences. 
Another idea is from an admissions standpoint, as it would be interesting to 
analyze how athletic success impacts the admissions process, in particular applicants and 
enrollment from students out of state and/or international. Basketball in particular is a 
global sport, and with the improvements to technology, steaming ability to watch online 
from virtually anywhere, and social media, fan bases exist in places that one would not 
expect and these individuals are able to communicate and connect with teams, schools, 
and the extended community. An opportunity for future research to break out the student 
admissions variables by region could be an interesting follow-up study and lead to a 
greater discussion of exploring NCAA competition in other parts of the world, even if 
just for an additional revenue stream and cultural learning experience.          
My current study looked at teams that won a game in the tournament, but it would 
also be interesting to look at whether teams that won more games in the tournament had 
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positive impacts both immediately and three years later, especially given some of the 
more recent case studies such as Loyola-Chicago in the 2018 March Madness 
Tournament. Additionally, determining if there is any connection to being a Cinderella 
team and/or winning a game in the tournament and faculty on campus would be 
interesting to study. Very little of a team’s tournament earnings return to academics, as 
mentioned previously, the majority of the Power Five public institutions give less than $1 
of every $100 earned from athletics to support academics (Wolverton & Kambhampati, 
2016). It may be helpful to see if institutions that make the tournament hire more faculty 
the year after or three years later, and if so, in what subject areas?  
Winning college athletics teams are not important to every student attending a 
college or debating their college choice. A deeper look at what marketing materials 
resonate with an incoming class would be interesting to study. In particular this analyzes 
the marketing materials and methods being used on a campus, and the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of them.  
CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to show the institutional financial and admissions factors 
that change due to a Cinderella appearance and/or winning a game in the annual Division 
I Men’s Basketball Tournament. The model used can be of help to a multitude of 
stakeholders, including athletic administrators and university presidents, to better 
understand the possibilities that making the annual tournament can provide a team and 
campus community as a whole. Campus decision makers may chose to improve social 
media handles and website content leading up to March in hopes of capitalizing upon 
increased interest and inquiry thanks to the national media attention.  This study helps 
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depict that the timing of any potential changes due to a school’s March Madness 
appearance, both immediately or three years later, never really matters. This study 
suggests that if a team is able to get into the tournament and/or win a game, schools 
should consider capitalizing upon the media attention and social media opportunities to 
grow interest in the program and the college community as a whole on the national stage 
but that this may not directly correlate with positive admissions and financial changes. 
This study adds to the existing literature on the advertising impact from athletic success 
on the national stage, as well as helps to fill the void of when the effects of making it to 
the tournament and/or winning a game are felt. Some of the magic in March cannot be 
quantified, but this study worked to make sense of the annual Cinderella’s through two 
definitions while measuring the impact on the entire campus community immediate and 
three years later.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A: Annual Non-Power Five Cinderella Teams 2003-2012 
Year School 
Regional 
Seed 
Win First Round 
Game (1) or Not (0) 
2012 Syracuse 1 1 
2012 Cincinnati 6 1 
2012 Gonzaga 7 1 
2012 
University of 
Southern Miss 9 0 
2012 West Virginia 10 0 
2012 Harvard 12 0 
2012 Montana 13 0 
2012 St. Bonaventure 14 0 
2012 Loyola 15 0 
2012 UNC Asheville 16 0 
2012 Georgetown 3 1 
2012 Temple 5 0 
2012 San Diego State 6 0 
2012 St. Mary's  7 0 
2012 Creighton 8 1 
2012 South Florida 12 1 
2012 Ohio 13 1 
2012 Belmont 14 0 
2012 Detroit 15 0 
2012 Lamar 16 0 
2012 Vermont 16 0 
2012 Marquette 3 1 
2012 Louisville 4 1 
2012 New Mexico 5 1 
2012 Murray State 6 1 
2012 Memphis 8 0 
2012 Saint Louis 9 1 
2012 Colorado State 11 0 
2012 
Cal State Long 
Beach 12 0 
2012 Davidson 13 0 
2012 BYU 14 0 
2012 Iona  14 0 
2012 Norfolk State 15 1 
2012 Long Island 16 0 
2012 Wichita State 5 0 
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2012 UNLV 6 0 
2012 Notre Dame 7 0 
2012 Connecticut 9 0 
2012 Xavier 10 1 
2012 VCU 12 1 
2012 New Mexico State 13 0 
2012 South Dakota State 14 0 
2012 Lehigh 15 1 
2012 
Mississippi Valley 
State 16 0 
2012 Western Kentucky 16 0 
2011 Syracuse 3 1 
2011 West Virginia 5 1 
2011 Xavier 6 0 
2011 George Mason 8 1 
2011 Villanova 9 0 
2011 Marquette 11 1 
2011 
University 
Alabama-
Birmingham 12 0 
2011 Princeton 13 0 
2011 Indiana State 14 0 
2011 Long Island 15 0 
2011 Texas-San Antonio 16 0 
2011 Alabama State 16 0 
2011 Pittsburgh 1 1 
2011 BYU 3 1 
2011 St. John's 6 0 
2011 Butler 8 1 
2011 Old Dominion 9 0 
2011 Gonzaga 11 1 
2011 Utah State 12 0 
2011 Belmont 13 0 
2011 Wofford 14 0 
2011 UC Santa Barbara 15 0 
2011 UNC Asheville 16 0 
2011 
Arkansas-Little 
Rock 16 0 
2011 Notre Dame 2 1 
2011 Louisville 4 0 
2011 Georgetown 6 0 
2011 UNLV 8 0 
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2011 VCU 11 1 
2011 Richmond 12 1 
2011 Morehead State 13 1 
2011 Saint Peter's  14 0 
2011 Akron 15 0 
2011 Boston University  16 0 
2011 San Diego State 2 1 
2011 Connecticut 3 1 
2011 Cincinnati 6 1 
2011 Temple 7 1 
2011 Memphis 12 0 
2011 Oakland 13 0 
2011 Bucknell 14 0 
2011 Northern Colorado 15 0 
2011 Hampton 16 0 
2010 West Virginia 2 1 
2010 New Mexico 3 1 
2010 Temple 5 0 
2010 Marquette 6 0 
2010 Cornell 12 1 
2010 Wofford 13 0 
2010 Montana 14 0 
2010 Morgan State 15 0 
2010 
East Tennessee 
State 16 0 
2010 Georgetown 3 0 
2010 UNLV 8 0 
2010 Northern Iowa 9 1 
2010 San Diego State 11 0 
2010 New Mexico State 12 0 
2010 Houston 13 0 
2010 Ohio 14 1 
2010 UC Santa Barbara 15 0 
2010 Lehigh 16 0 
2010 Villanova 2 1 
2010 Notre Dame 6 0 
2010 Richmond 7 0 
2010 Louisville  9 0 
2010 St. Mary's 10 1 
2010 Old Dominion 11 1 
2010 Utah State 12 0 
! 121 
2010 Siena 13 0 
2010 Sam Houston State 14 0 
2010 Robert Morris 15 0 
2010 Arkansas-Pine Bluff 16 0 
2010 Winthrop 16 0 
2010 Syracuse 1 1 
2010 Pittsburgh 3 1 
2010 Butler 5 1 
2010 Xavier 6 1 
2010 BYU 7 1 
2010 Gonzaga 8 1 
2010 U Texas- El Paso 12 0 
2010 Murray State 13 1 
2010 Oakland 14 0 
2010 North Texas 15 0 
2010 Vermont 16 0 
2009 Pittsburgh 1 1 
2009 Villanova 3 1 
2009 Xavier 4 1 
2009 VCU 11 0 
2009 Portland State 13 0 
2009 American 14 0 
2009 Binghamton 15 0 
2009 
East Tennessee 
State 16 0 
2009 Connecticut 1 1 
2009 Memphis 2 1 
2009 Marquette 6 1 
2009 BYU 8 0 
2009 Utah State 11 0 
2009 Northern Iowa 12 0 
2009 Cornell 14 0 
2009 
Cal State-
Northridge 15 0 
2009 
University of 
Tennessee - 
Chattanooga 16 0 
2009 Louisville 1 1 
2009 Utah 5 0 
2009 West Virginia 6 0 
2009 Siena 9 1 
2009 Dayton 11 1 
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2009 Cleveland State 13 1 
2009 North Dakota State 14 0 
2009 Robert Morris 15 0 
2009 Alabama State 16 0 
2009 Morehead State 16 0 
2009 Syracuse 3 1 
2009 Gonzaga 4 1 
2009 Butler 9 1 
2009 Temple 11 0 
2009 Western Kentucky 12 1 
2009 Akron 13 0 
2009 Stephen F. Austin 14 0 
2009 Morgan State 15 0 
2009 Radford 16 0 
2008 Louisville 3 1 
2008 Notre Dame 5 1 
2008 Butler 7 1 
2008 South Alabama 10 0 
2008 St. Joseph's 11 0 
2008 George Mason 12 0 
2008 Winthrop 13 0 
2008 Boise State 14 0 
2008 American 15 0 
2008 Mount St. Mary's 16 0 
2008 Coppin State 16 0 
2008 Xavier 3 1 
2008 Connecticut 4 0 
2008 Drake 5 0 
2008 West Virginia 7 1 
2008 BYU 8 0 
2008 Western Kentucky 12 1 
2008 San Diego 13 1 
2008 Belmont 15 0 
2008 
Mississippi Valley 
State 16 0 
2008 Georgetown 2 1 
2008 Gonzaga 7 0 
2008 UNLV 8 1 
2008 Kent State 9 0 
2008 Davidson 10 1 
2008 Villanova 12 1 
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2008 Siena 13 1 
2008 Cal State Fullerton 14 0 
2008 UMBC 15 0 
2008 Portland State 16 0 
2008 Memphis 1 1 
2008 Pittsburgh 4 1 
2008 Marquette 6 1 
2008 St. Mary's  10 0 
2008 Temple 12 0 
2008 Oral Roberts 13 0 
2008 Cornell 14 0 
2008 Austin Peay 15 0 
2008 Texas-Arlington 16 0 
2007 Butler 5 1 
2007 Notre Dame 6 0 
2007 UNLV 7 1 
2007 Winthrop 11 1 
2007 Old Dominion 12 0 
2007 Davidson 13 0 
2007 Miami (Ohio) 14 0 
2007 
Texas A&M-Corpus 
Christi 14 0 
2007 Jackson State 16 0 
2007 Georgetown 2 1 
2007 Marquette 8 0 
2007 George Washington 11 0 
2007 New Mexico State 13 0 
2007 Oral Roberts 14 0 
2007 Belmont 15 0 
2007 Eastern Kentucky 16 0 
2007 Memphis 2 1 
2007 Louisville 6 1 
2007 Nevada 7 1 
2007 BYU 8 0 
2007 Xavier 9 1 
2007 Creighton 10 0 
2007 
Cal State Long 
Beach 12 0 
2007 Albany 13 0 
2007 Penn 14 0 
2007 North Texas 15 0 
2007 Central Connecticut 16 0 
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State 
2007 Pittsburgh 3 1 
2007 Southern Illinois 4 1 
2007 Villanova 9 0 
2007 Gonzaga 10 0 
2007 VCU 11 1 
2007 Holy Cross 13 0 
2007 Wright State 14 0 
2007 Weber State 15 0 
2007 Niagara 16 0 
2007 Florida A&M 16 0 
2006 Syracuse 5 0 
2006 West Virginia 6 1 
2006 George Washington 8 1 
2006 UNC Wilmington 9 0 
2006 Southern Illinois 11 0 
2006 Iona 13 0 
2006 Northwestern State 14 1 
2006 Penn 15 0 
2006 Southern Illinois 11 0 
2006 Memphis 1 1 
2006 Gonzaga 3 1 
2006 Pittsburgh 5 1 
2006 Marquette 7 0 
2006 Bucknell 9 1 
2006 San Diego State 11 0 
2006 Kent State 12 0 
2006 Bradley 13 1 
2006 Xavier 14 0 
2006 Belmont 15 0 
2006 Oral Roberts 16 0 
2006 Connecticut 1 1 
2006 Wichita State 7 1 
2006 
University 
Alabama-
Birmingham 9 0 
2006 Seton Hall  10 0 
2006 George Mason 11 1 
2006 Utah State 12 0 
2006 Air Force 13 0 
2006 Murray State 14 0 
2006 Winthrop 15 0 
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2006 Albany 16 0 
2006 Villanova 1 1 
2006 Nevada 5 0 
2006 Georgetown 7 1 
2006 Northern Iowa 10 0 
2006 
UWisconsin-
Milwaukee 11 1 
2006 Montana 12 1 
2006 Pacific 13 0 
2006 South Alabama 14 0 
2006 Davidson 15 0 
2006 Monmouth 16 0 
2006 Hampton 16 0 
2005 Louisville 4 1 
2005 West Virginia 7 1 
2005 Pacific 8 1 
2005 Pittsburgh 9 0 
2005 Creighton 10 0 
2005 George Washington 12 0 
2005 Louisiana-Lafayette 13 0 
2005 Winthrop 14 0 
2005 
University of 
Tennessee-
Chattanooga 15 0 
2005 Montana 16 0 
2005 Connecticut 2 1 
2005 Villanova 5 1 
2005 UNC Charlotte 7 0 
2005 Northern Iowa 11 0 
2005 New Mexico 12 0 
2005 Ohio 13 0 
2005 Bucknell 14 1 
2005 Central Florida 15 0 
2005 Oakland 16 0 
2005 Alabama A&M 16 0 
2005 Syracuse 4 0 
2005 Utah 6 1 
2005 Cincinnati 7 1 
2005 U Texas- El Paso 11 0 
2005 Old Dominion 12 0 
2005 Vermont 13 1 
2005 Niagara 14 0 
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2005 Eastern Kentucky 15 0 
2005 Delaware State 16 0 
2005 Boston College 4 1 
2005 Southern Illinois 7 1 
2005 Nevada 9 1 
2005 St. Mary's  10 0 
2005 
University 
Alabama-
Birmingham 11 1 
2005 
University 
Wisconsin-
Milwaukee 12 1 
2005 Penn 13 0 
2005 Utah State 14 0 
2005 
Southeastern 
Louisiana 15 0 
2005 Fairleigh Dickinson 16 0 
2005 Gonzaga 3 1 
2004 St. Joseph's 1 1 
2004 Pittsburgh 3 1 
2004 Memphis 7 1 
2004 UNC Charlotte 9 0 
2004 Richmond 11 0 
2004 Manhattan 12 1 
2004 VCU 13 0 
2004 Central Florida 14 0 
2004 Eastern Washington 15 0 
2004 Liberty 16 0 
2004 Gonzaga 2 1 
2004 Providence 5 0 
2004 Boston College 6 1 
2004 
University 
Alabama-
Birmingham 9 1 
2004 Nevada 10 1 
2004 Utah 11 0 
2004 Pacific 12 1 
2004 
University Illinois-
Chicago 13 0 
2004 Northern Iowa 14 0 
2004 Valparaiso 15 0 
2004 Florida A&M 16 0 
2004 Lehigh 16 0 
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2004 Cincinnati 4 1 
2004 Xavier 7 1 
2004 Seton Hall 8 1 
2004 Louisville 10 0 
2004 Air Force 11 0 
2004 Murray State 12 0 
2004 
East Tennessee 
State 13 0 
2004 Princeton 14 0 
2004 Monmouth 15 0 
2004 Alabama State 16 0 
2004 Connecticut 2 1 
2004 Syracuse 5 1 
2004 DePaul 7 1 
2004 Southern Illinois 9 0 
2004 Dayton 10 0 
2004 Western Michigan 11 0 
2004 BYU 12 0 
2004 U Texas- El Paso 13 0 
2004 Louisiana-Lafayette 14 0 
2004 Vermont 15 0 
2004 Texas-San Antonio 16 0 
2003 Syracuse 3 1 
2003 Louisville 4 1 
2003 St. Joseph's 7 0 
2003 Penn 11 0 
2003 Butler 12 1 
2003 Austin Peay 13 0 
2003 Manhattan 14 0 
2003 East Tennessee 15 0 
2003 South Carolina State 16 0 
2003 Xavier 3 1 
2003 Connecticut 5 1 
2003 UNC Wilmington 11 0 
2003 BYU 12 0 
2003 San Diego 13 0 
2003 Troy State 14 0 
2003 Sam Houston State 15 0 
2003 UNC Asheville 16 0 
2003 Texas Southern 16 0 
2003 Pittsburgh 2 1 
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2003 Marquette 3 1 
2003 Dayton 4 0 
2003 Utah 9 1 
2003 Southern Illinois 11 0 
2003 Weber State 12 0 
2003 Tulsa 13 1 
2003 Holy Cross 14 0 
2003 Wagner 15 0 
2003 IUPUI 16 0 
2003 Notre Dame 5 1 
2003 Creighton 6 0 
2003 Memphis 7 0 
2003 Cincinnati 8 0 
2003 Gonzaga 9 1 
2003 Central Michigan 11 1 
2003 
University 
Wisconsin-
Milwaukee 12 0 
2003 Western Kentucky 13 0 
2003 Colorado State 14 0 
2003 Utah State 15 0 
2003 Vermont 16 0 
 
Source: Men's NCAA® BasketballTournament Bracket History. Retrieved from 
https://www.allbrackets.com/ 
 
 
Table B: BIG EAST Teams in March Madness 2003-2012 
 
Yea
r School 
Regional 
Seed 
Win First Round Game 
(1)  
or Not (0) 
2012 Syracuse 1 1 
2012 Cincinnati 6 1 
2012 West Virginia 10 0 
2012 Georgetown 3 1 
2012 South Florida 12 1 
2012 Marquette 3 1 
2012 Louisville 4 1 
2012 Notre Dame 7 0 
2012 Connecticut 9 0 
2011 Syracuse 3 1 
2011 West Virginia 5 1 
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2011 Villanova 9 0 
2011 Marquette 11 1 
2011 Pittsburgh 1 1 
2011 St. John's 6 0 
2011 Notre Dame 2 1 
2011 Louisville 4 0 
2011 Georgetown 6 0 
2011 Connecticut 3 1 
2011 Cincinnati 6 1 
2010 West Virginia 2 1 
2010 Marquette 6 0 
2010 Georgetown 3 0 
2010 Villanova 2 1 
2010 Notre Dame 6 0 
2010 Louisville  9 0 
2010 Syracuse 1 1 
2010 Pittsburgh 3 1 
2009 Pittsburgh 1 1 
2009 Villanova 3 1 
2009 Connecticut 1 1 
2009 Marquette 6 1 
2009 Louisville 1 1 
2009 West Virginia 6 0 
2009 Syracuse 3 1 
2008 Louisville 3 1 
2008 Notre Dame 5 1 
2008 Georgetown 2 1 
2008 Villanova 12 1 
2008 Pittsburgh 4 1 
2008 Marquette 6 1 
2007 Notre Dame 6 0 
2007 Georgetown 2 1 
2007 Marquette 8 0 
2007 Louisville 6 1 
2007 Pittsburgh 3 1 
2007 Villanova 9 0 
2006 Syracuse 5 0 
2006 West Virginia 6 1 
2006 Pittsburgh 5 1 
2006 Marquette 7 0 
2006 Connecticut 1 1 
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2006 Seton Hall  10 0 
2006 Villanova 1 1 
2006 Georgetown 7 1 
2005 West Virginia 7 1 
2005 Pittsburgh 9 0 
2005 Connecticut 2 1 
2005 Villanova 5 1 
2005 Syracuse 4 0 
2005 
Boston 
College 4 1 
2004 Pittsburgh 3 1 
2004 Providence 5 0 
2004 
Boston 
College 6 1 
2004 Seton Hall 8 1 
2004 Connecticut 2 1 
2004 Syracuse 5 1 
2003 Syracuse 3 1 
2003 Connecticut 5 1 
2003 Pittsburgh 2 1 
2003 Notre Dame 5 1 
 
Source: Men's NCAA® BasketballTournament Bracket History. Retrieved from 
https://www.allbrackets.com/ 
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Table C My Generalized Linear Regressions Without BIG EAST Schools  
Without BIG EAST Schools Looking at the Outcome: Applications  
Cinderella Definitions Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. Error Sig. B Std. Error Sig. 
Cinderella  -.038 .0175 *    
Win a Game    .000 .0294  
CONTROLS       
Applications .969 .0153 *** .969 .0153 *** 
Percent Admitted  .219 .0378 *** .216 .0379 *** 
Enrolled -.010 .0144  -.010 .0144  
Gifts .026 .0037 *** .026 .0037 *** 
SAT .000 4.4074E-5 ** .000 4.4120E-5 ** 
Director’s Cup .029 .0208  .045 .0207 * 
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 
Without BIG EAST Schools Looking at the Outcome: Percent Admitted  
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  .016 .0075 *    
Win a Game    .002 .0127  
CONTROLS        
Applications -.029 .0066 *** -.029 .0066 *** 
Percent Admitted  .779 .0163 *** .780 .0164 *** 
Enrolled .028 .0062  .028 .0062 *** 
Gifts -.005 .0016 *** -.005 .0016 *** 
SAT -7.346E-
5 
1.9040E-5 *** -7.327E-5 1.9058E-5 *** 
Director’s Cup .017 .0090  .011 .0089  
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 
Without BIG EAST Schools Looking at the Outcome: Enrolled   
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. 
Error 
Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Cinderella  -.008 .0117     
Win a Game    -.015 .0196  
CONTROLS       
Applications .032 .0102 ** .032 .0102 ** 
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Percent Admitted .122 .0253 *** .123 .0254 *** 
Enrolled .972 .0096 *** .972 .0096 *** 
Gifts .006 .0024 * .006 .0024 ** 
SAT 1.172E-5 2.9501E-5  1.137E-5 2.9503E-
5 
 
Director’s Cup .031 .0139 * .031 .0138 * 
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 
Without BIG EAST Schools Looking at the Outcome: Gifts   
Cinderella Definitions Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. Error Sig. B Std. Error Sig. 
Cinderella  -.053 .0422     
Win a Game    -.054 .0711  
CONTROLS       
Applications .006 .0370  .007 .0370  
Percent Admitted -.022 .0916  -.022 .0917  
Enrolled .057 .0348  .057 .0348  
Gifts .911 .0091 *** .911 .0092 *** 
SAT .001 .0001 *** .001 .0001 *** 
Director’s Cup -.068 .0505  -.058 .0501  
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 
Without BIG EAST Schools Looking at the Outcome: SAT  
Cinderella 
Definitions 
Making the Tournament Win a Game 
OUTCOMES B Std. Error Sig. B Std. Error Sig. 
Cinderella  1.776 5.4078     
Win a Game    3.777 9.1452  
CONTROLS       
Applications 9.816 4.7233  9.768 4.7236 * 
Percent Admitted  -26.360 11.6896 ** -26.534 11.7043 * 
Enrolled -8.533 4.4580  -8.487 4.4609  
Gifts 10.647 1.1217 *** 10.629 1.1230 *** 
SAT .790 .0135 *** .790 .0135 *** 
Director’s Cup 8.098 6.4705  8.247 6.4313  
Significant Codes: ‘***’=p<0.001  ‘**’=p<0.01  ‘*’=p<0.05  ‘.’=p<0.1 
 
Source: My Generalized Linear Dataset  
